









Mosenhauer, Moritz (2020) Essays on counter strategies against mistakes in 







Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge  
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author  
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
















Essays on Counter Strategies Against Mistakes in
Information Processing with Various Applications
Thesis by:
Moritz Mosenhauer, M.Sc.
Submitted in fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of:
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Adam Smith Business School, College of Social Science
University of Glasgow
June, 2020
This page is intentionally left blank.
Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters, dealing with mistakes in information processing
and how smart information design may improve upon it.
Chapter 1 studies a firm’s organisational responses if its agents misevaluate informa-
tion. If a manager overreacts to unusual events, it may be desirable for the firm to adopt
the management practice management-by-exception. I develop a theoretical framework
to study this technique and derive conditions under parsimonious assumptions for when
it should be adopted. Moreover, I show how further assumptions can refine the model’s
predictions, establishing a direct link between the manager’s over-responsiveness and
organisational rigidity. The strategy is implemented by controlling the information that
the manager receives. In fact, in the absence of information transmission and processing
costs, it may be optimal to not send inherently valuable signals concerning the economy’s
state to the manager.
Chapter 2 investigates tools to counter excessive stock trading and increase profits
for private households participating in the stock market. Creating a stylised hold or
trade-scenario in a computer laboratory experiment, I find that by solely changing the
information the participants receive, trading activity can be reduced by roughly 30%,
increasing trading profits by more than 0.55 percentage points on monthly net returns. In
particular, I consider two information treatments. First, I provide the participants with
additional information by giving detailed feedback on their actions and outcomes at every
turn. Second, when considering whether to hold a given stock or trade it for another
one, I restrict participants’ information on the recent performance of their allocated
stock. Both interventions lead to significant changes in behaviour. Additionally, the
2× 2 experimental design reveals that the effects stack.
Chapter 3 deals with growth diagnostics. Growth diagnostics is an influential policy
framework that, in second-best settings, has been used to identify the priorities of policy
reform in different countries. With limited information about the nature of interaction
between different second-best distortions, mistakes (situations where realized social wel-
i
fare losses overwhelm any intended gains) could occur in the implementation of growth
diagnostics. Even allowing for the possibility of mistakes, would an adaptive implemen-
tation of growth diagnostics converge to a socially optimal outcome? This paper sets
out the conditions under which such convergence occurs. A number of different historical
examples are discussed to illustrate how such a process could play out in practice.
ii
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Consider a manager that needs to correctly set priorities for allocating scarce resources
within a firm across its sectors, say, production and marketing, in order to adapt the
work processes better to changing circumstances. If the manager is perfectly rational,
more information, such as knowledge of demand shocks in the economy or changes in
the demographics of targeted buyers, will always improve this judgement. However, if
the manager systematically misevaluates information, it may also introduce a bias and
thereby drive her away from the correct choice. In this case, the manager’s decision-
making may be improved by providing less information.
I show that a firm’s system of management practices may take up the role of aiding
the manager by acting as a smart pass-through for information. In particular, I provide
a behavioural foundation for a firm’s choice to only brief the manager on sufficiently
unusual events, i.e. adapt management-by-exception (see Section 1.2.2 for a verbal
definition and a discussion of the concept), when the manager overreacts to salient
information (see Section 1.2.1 for a conceptual discussion and empirical evidence on
behavioural biases in managerial decision-making).
This paper deals with firms that do not face conflicts of interest: two individuals,
a manager (she) and an owner (he), attempt to maximise a common objective. The
manager directly affects the firm’s profit. In particular, she decides how to use scarce
resources in order to adapt the firm’s work processes to a changing productive environ-
ment. Information regarding the state of the economy, per se, is a valuable signal in
doing so. However, the manager has a tendency to misevaluate this information when
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incorporating it into her decision-making by overemphasising salient events. This may
lead to a misallocation of resources and, thus, a failure to maximise profits.
In this setting, it is impossible to achieve the first-best outcome implied by per-
fectly informed and non-biased managerial decision-making. But the owner may still
pursue a second-best solution by deciding whether or not and, more precisely, to what
degree to implement the management technique management-by-exception. He does so
by merely varying the information available to the manager on the economy’s state so
that she is only briefed if exceptional occurrences arise. Restricting access to any infor-
mation concerning comparatively usual events, the owner may eliminate the manager’s
psychological bias through evoking adherence to an ex ante optimal plan, but he will
also decrease the firm’s adaptability. On the other hand, for comparatively exceptional
events the owner may wish to forfeit the institutional rigidity and inform the manager
of the unusual occurrences, however, at the cost of reintroducing the bias.
Investigating the owner’s trade-off between either a better informed or a less biased
decision-making by of the manager, as captured by the implementation of management-
by-exception, shall be the main focus of this article. Under parsimonious assumptions, I
first identify manager- and production-specific characteristics driving the adoption of this
management practice (see Proposition 2). More fine-grained predictions can further be
made if the state of the economy is assumed to be standard normally distributed: then,
for all possible productive settings there exists a uniquely optimal way of defining what
should constitute an ’exception’ in guiding managerial attention (see Proposition 3).
With this article, I make three major contributions. I formulate a possible organ-
isational coping strategy when workers within the firm are affected by psychological
biases in valueing their options. My research thus aligns with the seminal work of Simon
(1945), who places aspects of bounded rationality at the centre of the debate on how to
optimally design organisations. While a host of other theoretical studies work in this
tradition, they have so far largely been restricted to information transmission constraints
as the sole imperfection in the agents’ decision-making (see Dessein and Prat, 2016, for
a review). In going beyond this, my research answers recent mounting evidence suggest-
ing that behaviourally biased valuation by top managers is, in fact, a prevalent real-life
phenomenon.
Moreover, I present a novel model providing a theoretical foundation for a firm’s
choice of whether to adopt management-by-exception. Following Bertrand and Schoar
(2003), there has been a surge of interest in the financial and economic literature in
explaining the adoption choice of management styles and techniques by organisations
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and their effectiveness in practice (e.g. Bloom and Reenen, 2007; Benmelech and Fry-
dman, 2015; Bloom et al., 2017). Long preceding this trend, extensive research efforts
have been made in the management literature pursuing the same objective. Based on
Bass (1985)’s extension of the transactional-transformational leadership paradigm, Bass
designed the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire survey including tokens specifically
designed to test for the implementation of management-by-exception. With more than
80 studies conducted using the survey-tool, a number of meta-analyses have attempted
to empirically summarise the findings.
While these studies successfully uncover some stable relationships between man-
agement practices and measures of effectiveness, management-by-exception remains a
’problem child’. (Judge and Piccolo, 2004, p. 755) state that ’management by exception
(active and passive) was inconsistently related to the criteria’. Similarly, (Lowe et al.,
1996, p. 416) note that ’Management-by-Exception [was] inconsistent in [its] relation-
ships with effectiveness across studies. Some research evidenced positive associations,
while other findings showed a negative association’.
While there have been previous studies that capture how management-by-exception
is implemented in a firm, these do not allow a meaningful analysis of whether or not a
firm should adopt it. In Athey et al. (1994), the adoption of the technique is assumed,
while in Garicano (2000) and Beggs (2001) it is inextricably related with the presence of
a hierarchy. The adoption of the technique is thus given apart from the unrealistic case
of a firm with only workers and no managers. Also, all previous models feature some
explicit or implicit costs of information transmission. I show that firms may benefit
from implementing management-by-exception even in the absence of any such costs. By
considering a different set of underlying drivers, I derive a set of new comparative statics
which not only provide new predictions but also help illuminate previous findings (see
Section 1.4).
Lastly, even though virtually all of the literature on management-by-exception agrees
on the importance of establishing a plan that allows identifying exceptions, there only
exists vague guidance on how such a system should be set up and calibrated. For exam-
ple, management-by-exception has in recent years received interest towards applications
in the automation of unmanned aircraft. Such aircraft may perform all necessary func-
tions automatically while skilled personnel are ready on the ground to remotely take
control over the machine if unusual circumstances arise. However, when practically im-
plementing the system it has been observed that ’defining the basis for switching levels
of automation support to the human remains difficult’ (Dekker and Woods, 1999, p.
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88). Experience-based rule-of-thumb and intuitive graphical analyses appear to be com-
mon methods in practice. To the best of my knowledge, there does not exist a rigorous
theoretical foundation to answer a central question: ”What is an exception?” (Dekker
and Woods, 1999, p. 88) In Section 1.5, I show that this question can, in fact, be an-
swered precisely in the given setting if sufficiently strong assumptions are placed on the
distribution of the task-level shocks.
1.1.1 Related Literature
The article should be read as complementary to the recent literature in team theory
and organizational economics featuring imperfect agents. A host of studies using a
similar functional setting that favours adaptation to local shocks have pointed out the
desirability of institutional rigidities. Dessein et al. (2016) find that if there are explicit
costs of coordination across tasks, it may be optimal to fix the firm’s operations for a
large number of its activities and focus attention on a small number of core competencies.
In Powell (2015), static bureaucratic rules prevent managers from engaging in costly
influence-activities in an attempt to shape the organisation’s outcomes towards their
personal goals. However, in both of these models the communication channels and
governance structures, respectively, cannot respond to the realisation of the shock vector,
precluding any chance of flexibility in the organisational framework and to manage-by-
exception in particular.
Interestingly, the main trade-off in this paper — better information versus a less-
biased decision-making — is essentially identical to that of Dessein (2002), while it is
arrived at and resolved from two different angles. In Dessein (2002), a principal holds
decision rights and decides whether to delegate or simply gather information from an
agent that strategically communicates. In my paper, delegation is fixed to a manager who
is naive towards the bias in her decision-making and therefore behaves non-strategically.
It is then the principal who strategically chooses the amount of information supplied to
the manager in order to favourably affect the outcome.
In spirit, this paper is closest to Dessein and Santos (2016) in dealing with optimal
organisational responses to managers who are biased in their valuation of the economy’s
state towards certain tasks. Methodologically, however, this article can best be under-
stood as a team-theoretical, bounded-rationality take on Brocas and Carrillo (2007),
where the decision of information transmission versus information restriction is made
with respect to the size of the local shocks instead of iterative revealing of noisy sig-
nals. As an interesting sidenote, this article shows that it is possible to relax the strict
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assumption of information being public by assuming both the distribution of shocks as
well as the information restriction device to be symmetric.
The literature on Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design studies a similar prob-
lem as this paper: a set of principals attempt to affect a set of agents’ choices by selecting
and committing to an information structure which maps possible states of the world into
signals. Using the terminology of Bergemann and Morris (2016), this paper’s setup most
closely resembles the case of Bayesian Persuasion with an uninformed receiver, since there
exist one agent and one principal where the principal has an informational advantage
over the agent1.
Due to some key differences, however, my work should be viewed as distinct from
this literature. Instead of dealing with players with inherently conflicting interests,
the principal in my case attempts to rectify decision-making mistakes stemming from
the agent’s distorted evaluation of salient states of the economy. In this scenario, it
is natural to adopt a continuous state space, since the agent could otherwise perceive
states which she knows cannot exist. The two most common solution procedures used in
the literature, concavification (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) and linear programming
over Bayes-Correlated Equilibria (Bergemann and Morris, 2019), do not apply when
there are infinitely many states. While Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) and Ivanov
(2015) have developed procedures allowing for infinite state spaces, these place some
crucial restrictions on the preferences of the principal, namely that the economy’s states
do not enter them directly. Since in this article’s setup the principal does not only care
what action the agent takes but rather whether the agent’s action constitutes a mistake
for a certain state of the world, these approaches should be deemed unfitting for the
problem under study.
More generally speaking, my findings corroborate articles that are driven by explicit
or implicit costs of information transmission or processing such as Sah and Stiglitz
(1986), de Clippel et al. (2017) and Calvó-Armengol et al. (2015). While this paper
takes a reduced-form approach in modelling the agents’ mistakes, some articles take
a step towards endogenising decision imperfections by letting agents react optimally
to limited information processing capabilities in the sense of Sims (2003)’s ’rational
inattention’ (see e.g. Dessein et al., 2016; Dessein and Santos, 2016).
Although the saliency bias enters this paper’s model exogenously, its results itself
can be interpreted as endogenising decision mistakes. In particular, the mechanism
1As noted in Bergemann and Morris (2019), although in this paper the principal commits to an
information structure before observing the signal, it suffices that the final signal realisation can be
conditioned on the true state of the world.
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can be understood as a device for efficient attention allocation by negotiating top-down
and bottom-up drivers in guiding focus (see Wolfe et al., 2003), especially if an intra-
personal view on the model is adopted (see footnote 4). The model’s framework may
thus be utilised to provide further structure to the tunnelling-mechanism described in
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) or even consumers reacting to extraordinary events in
Reis (2004).
1.2 Discussion of related concepts
1.2.1 Salience and Behaviourally Biased Managers
Previous research shows that the behaviour of lower-level workers is partly driven by
behavioural, non-monetary motivations (see for example Blanco et al. (2017) or Danilov
and Sliwka (2017)). There is also ample evidence, however, suggesting that the decision-
making of top managers is influenced by psychological factors. Malmendier and Tate
(2005) show that measures of overconfidence predict investment decisions of Forbes 500
managers. Malmendier et al. (2011) and Bernile et al. (2017) find that even formative
events long before the managers’ careers start, such as exposure to economic or natural
disasters, shape their strategies of corporate financing and risk-taking.
Some of these behavioural biases appear to work through how managers incorporate
information into their decision-making. In an early, impactful article, Ocasio (1997)
cites the ’saliency of issues and answers’ (p. 195) as one of six main mechanisms gov-
erning management choices. The role of saliency in individual decision-making is a
well-established psychological phenomenon and has received considerable attention from
economics. It posits that people do not treat all information equally, but instead some
attributes may involuntarily make some pieces of information ’stand out’ and cause them
to subsequently receive a disproportionate weight in their decision-making (see Taylor
and Fiske (1978) for a review in psychology and DellaVigna (2009) for one in economics).
A series of articles corroborate this view. Dittmar and Duchin (2016) show that
personal experience has a stronger influence on a manager’s later behaviour if it is
gathered during a salient period in their career, while Gennaioli et al. (2016) attest
that top CFOs overvalue recent observations when predicting earnings. Englmaier et
al. (2017) offer evidence from a randomised controlled trial where they treat a number
of managers with altered information designs regarding the incentive schemes while
keeping actual compensation unchanged. They, too, argue that differences in behaviour
stem from increased salience of certain dimensions of the productive process.
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While Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) formulate a model with a similar focus, I will closely
follow Bordalo et al. (2013) in functionally capturing the manager’s systematic bias (see
Section 1.3.2 for the mathematical formulation). In Bordalo et al. (2013)’s setup, it
is those attributes that differ most strongly from what is considered as ’usual’ that
gain salience. Results from Barber and Odean (2008) seemingly underpin this view.
Studying individual stock traders, they find that ’stocks experiencing high abnormal
trading volume (...) and stocks with extreme one-day returns’ (Barber and Odean,
2008, p. 785) are bought disproportionately much.
1.2.2 Management Practices
Management-by-exception embodies a systematic decision-making procedure for evalu-
ating and reacting to challenges encountered by an organisation. Bass (1990) provides
a concise definition of the concept, stating a leader who manages by exception
watches and searches for deviations from rules and standards, takes corrective
action (p. 22)
The Business Dictionary (2018) elaborates further on this, defining management-by-
exception as a
practice whereby only the information that indicates a significant deviation
of actual results from the budgeted or planned results is brought to the man-
agement’s notice. Its objective is to facilitate management’s focus on really
important tactical and strategic tasks.
The management literature usually distinguishes between active management-by-
exception and passive management-by-exception. The former is conceptually close to
laissez-faire leadership where the leader prefers to remain inactive unless exceptional
problems arise. This paper studies the former, as the manager will always take action
within the model. As the crucial hallmark of the management technique I identify its
information management, namely that the manager is only briefed on exceptional occur-
rences. Therefore, the benchmark to which the adoption of management-by-exception
will be compared throughout the paper is the scenario where the manager is fully in-
formed at all times.
The concept has long been subject to academic debate, with an early treatment of
the general idea dating back to Towne (1886). It has gained substantial prominence
in the management literature since Bass (1990) included it as a core characteristic of
leadership in his extension of the transactional-transformational paradigm introduced
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by Burns (1978). In fact, (Patterson et al., 1995, p. 3) argue that ”over the past decade
there has probably not been a more dominant paradigm in leadership thought”.
Management-by-exception also enjoys widespread use in practice. Mackintosh (1978)
reports that by the 1970s the technique already enjoyed widespread use in a large variety
of fields. Nowadays, it is one of seven core principles of the PRINCE2 system, one of the
world’s most prevalent structured project management methods with over 1.4 million
certified graduates2 from a diverse array of countries and economic sectors (Axelos,
2016).
While the intended application of this practice was business management, management-
by-exception has recently received further interest from air traffic control and specifically
the automation of unmanned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft are already widely used in
military operations (Hottman and Sortland, 2006) and is ’on the verge of taking flight
alongside manned aircraft in the National Airspace System’ (Liu et al., 2013, p. 424) in
the United States of America. Such aircraft may perform all necessary functions auto-
matically while skilled personnel are ready on the ground to remotely take control over
the machine if unusual circumstances arise. There appears to be a consensus in the rele-
vant literature that a major bottleneck for a successful introduction of these systems lies
in ’defining the basis for switching levels of automation support to the human’ (Dekker
and Woods, 1999, p. 88) and that ’an appropriate level of automation is critical to the
safety and performance characteristics of [unmanned aircraft systems] design.’ (Liu et
al., 2013, p. 425)
Analogous to this, this article characterises management-by-exception as an inter-
play between ex ante (before observing the current state of the world) and ex post (after
observing the current state of the world) modes of decision-making. Following Dessein
et al. (2016), I borrow vocabulary from March and Simon (1958)3 in identifying these
two modes of decision-making as management-by-plan and management-by-feedback, re-
spectively. Investigating the optimal, exception-based switching point between plan and
feedback management shall in fact be the main interest of this study.
2Database freely accessible at https://www.axelos.com/successful-candidates-register, ac-
cessed 19th of July, 2018
3(March and Simon, 1958, p.182) remark: ’We may label coordination based on pre-established sched-




I posit a one-shot sequential-move principal-agent model,4 which I solve for a second-
best solution by backward induction. Decision rights over the firm’s operations are
fixedly delegated to the agent (henceforth called the manager, she) who is the only one
that may directly affect the firm’s profits. However, she naively and irreversibly makes
mistakes in incorporating information upon observing the state of the economy, which
introduces a systematic bias into her decision-making and causes her to potentially fail
in maximising the firm’s profits. The principal (henceforth called the owner, he), can
influence the actions of the manager by controlling her access to information. In doing
so, he faces a trade-off between a better-informed manager and a less-biased decision-
making. Figure 1.1 shows the model’s timeline5.




















I follow much of the relevant literature in assuming a tracking-cost framework as
the functional setting (Dessein, 2002; Rantakari, 2008; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2015;
Powell, 2015; Dessein et al., 2016). Moreover, I choose a team-theoretic setting where
all individuals in the firm, the manager and the owner, attempt to maximise the firm’s
expected profits, although the manager’s propensity to misevaluate signals may lead to
a failure to do so. The firm earns profits π across two tasks, or sectors, indexed with s





Ks − βs · |θs − as(m(ω))|λ
]
(1.1)
4I opt to model the two decision-makers within the organisation, the manager and the owner, as two
separate individuals. This is, however, simply due to expositional convenience. Apart from their different
action spaces in the model, the manager’s role is to unconsciously be biased by psychological factors
while the owner’s role is to take this bias into account and take precautions in order to avoid adverse
consequences arising from it. In the spirit of Thaler and Shefrin (1981), the inter-personal problem could
equivalently be understood as an intra-personal problem of a single individual with two selves. Although
the manager may be inherently unable to reverse her own tendency to misevaluate, she may be aware
of it and put mechanisms into place in order to commit her future self to a restricted set of information.
5It should be noted that actions are only taken in period 1 and 4. I opt for describing the model in
extensive form as it clarifies key aspects of it, e.g. the owner commits to a choice before the state of the
world is realised as well as an inherent difference between the realisation of the state of the economy and
the manager’s information.
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where Ks is the fix revenue for task s which, without loss of generality, is normalised to
0 for both s; θs are real numbers which are drawn from a single distribution with density
function g(θs); βs are strictly positive real numbers assigning ex-ante weights to the two
tasks; λ is a strictly positive real number governing the curvature of the costs across
both tasks; and m( · ) is the choice of the manager made on the basis of information ω,
which translates into firm-level outcomes via a1 and a2.
The firm incurs costs according to the random task-level shocks θs. Throughout the
article I will maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Let the density function g(θs) be such that for any s
(i) E[θs] exists
(ii) g(θs) is continuous
(iii) g(θs) is symmetric around 0.
It is the manager’s role to shape the firm-level outcomes a1 and a2 by appropriately
choosing m(ω) in order to avoid such costs. Thus, the firm’s objective is to adapt as
best as possible to changes in the productive environment.
1.3.1 The Owner
The owner cannot directly influence the profits of the firm. He can, however, affect
the decision-making of the manager by deciding whether or not and, more precisely,
to what degree to implement the management technique management-by-exception (see
Section 1.2.2 for a discussion). He does so by purposefully controlling the amount of
information available to the manager, denoted by ω ∈ Ω. At all times, ω contains at
least the following information: (a) the profit function π, including full knowledge of
the parameters β1, β2 and λ, (b) all available information on the density function of the
task-level shocks g(θs) and (c) the structure of the problem.
6 This fundamental set of
information is denoted with ω.
The manager will then either remain with her fundamental knowledge ω or she will
additionally receive full information on the task-level shocks θ1 and θ2, resulting in the
final knowledge denoted ω := {ω, θ1, θ2}. This hinges on the owner’s choice of imple-
menting management-by-exception. If he does not adopt the practice, the manager will
always receive full information on the state of the economy. If, on the other hand,
6In the current setup, it makes no difference to the model’s results whether and to what extent the
manager can observe the owner’s action. I discuss this point after introducing the manager’s action
space in Section 1.3.3.
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he does, the manager will only receive additional information once exceptional circum-
stances arise. I model the owner’s choice via a real number z ∈ [0,∞). This choice
affects the information available to the manager in the following way.
ω =
{
ω if |θ1| ∧ |θ2| < z
ω if |θ1| ∨ |θ2| > z
If the realisation for at least one of the realisations of the task-level shocks θ1 or θ2
deviates by more than z from their expected value (which by Assumption 1 is normalised
to 0), the manager will receive full information on both values. In this case, events
are sufficiently extreme to be considered an ’exception’. If, on the other hand, both
realisations of the task-level shocks are sufficiently moderate so that neither of them
deviate by more than z from their expected value, the manager receives no information on
the state of the economy but instead makes her decisions on the basis of her fundamental
knowledge ω. In this case, the firm concludes that no ’exception’ has occurred.
Given this characterisation, I identify the implementation of management-by-exception
within the model as well as different degrees of management-by-exception in the following
way.
Definition 1. The firm implements management-by-exception if the owner chooses any
strictly positive value for z. Different values of z correspond to different degrees of
management-by-exception being implemented, where lower values of z correspond to a
more sensitive organisation and higher values of z to a more rigid organisation.
1.3.2 The Manager
The manager attempts to adapt the firm’s operations to the productive environment.
In order to add economic relevance to the problem, I implicitly assume that the firm
has limited resources at its disposal so that the operations cannot be perfectly adapted
to the state of the economy. The manager must therefore decide how to prioritise the
firm’s tasks when allocating these resources. I formalise this decision as a binary choice
based on the manager’s available information.
m : Ω→ {1, 2} (1.2)


















if m(ω) = 2
Without intervention by the manager, work for both tasks is carried out doing
’business-as-usual’ by setting a1 = a2 = E[θ]. The manager then improves on this
outcome by either deciding to use scarce resources, such as having people work overtime
or sending out a task force, towards further adapting task s = 1 (by choosing m(ω) = 1)
or towards further adapting task s = 2 (by choosing m(ω) = 2). For simplicity, I model
the manager’s options in a way that task performance is perfectly adapted to the task
shocks or not at all. The model’s focus thereby lies on examining the manager’s problem
to correctly prioritise the firm’s tasks and ensure that resources are funnelled to where
the benefits are the greatest. This evidently abstracts from potentially interesting ’adap-
tation portfolios’ the manager may wish to build, which may be an avenue for further
research.
For the remainder of this section, I will charaterise the manager’s modes of decision-
making under the two feasible exposures to information: ex ante (, i.e. without regard
to the current state of the economy) and ex post (, i.e. taking the current state of the
economy into account). I follow the language of Dessein et al. (2016) in labelling these
management-by-plan and management-by-feedback, respectively.
Management-by-plan
Definition 2. The firm is managed by plan if the manager makes her decision solely on
the basis of her fundamental knowledge such that ω = ω.
The manager would prefer to choose m(ω) = 1 if and only if it yields higher profits
than choosing m(ω) = 2. Since under management-by-plan, by definition, the manager
makes this decision without observing the local shocks θs, she must make her decision
on the basis of the expected profits under each action.
E[−β2 · |θ2|λ] ≥ E[−β1 · |θ1|λ]
⇐⇒ γ ≤ 1 (1.3)
where I define γ ≡ β2β1 . I arrive at inequality 1.3 as both θ1 and θ2 are drawn from the
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same distribution.7
Assumption 2. Without loss of generality, relabel β1 and β2 such that β1 ≥ β2.
Without observing the state-of-the economy, the manager will always choose to pri-
oritise the task that carries the higher ex ante weight. By construction, this coincides
with task 1.
Management-by-feedback
Definition 3. The firm is managed by feedback if the manager observes the state of the
economy before making her decision such that ω = ω.
When managing by feedback, the manager does not have to form expectations over
the state of the economy but can base her decision where to direct the organisational
focus on the severity of the actual task-level shocks. However, when incorporating this
information into her decision-making she misevaluates it. Particularly, she is psychologi-
cally biased towards salient events and, as a consequence, overweights extreme outcomes
that differ strongly from the expected outcomes (see Section 1.2.1 for a further discussion
on this).
I closely follow Bordalo et al. (2013) in capturing this functionally. I identify the
reference level for evaluating the task-level shocks with their expected value E[θs] = 0
(see Assumption 1). Given a pair of realisations θ1 and θ2, the manager then inflates
(deflates) the relative weight of the event that departed more (less) strongly from what
was expected by a factor of 1
δ̂
(δ̂). Hence, if she manages-by-feedback, she will choose to
adapt task s = 1 if and only if
−β2 · δ2(θ1, θ2) · |θ2|λ ≥ −β1 · δ1(θ1, θ2) · |θ1|λ (1.4)
where
δs(θ1, θ2) =
 δ̂ if |θs − E[θs]| < |θ−s − E[θ−s]| ⇐⇒ |θs| < |θ−s|
1 if |θs − E[θs]| > |θ−s − E[θ−s]| ⇐⇒ |θs| > |θ−s|
where 0 < δ̂ < 1.
It is important to note that I assume the manager to be naive towards this bias,
meaning that she is perfectly unaware of it and treats her subjective observations as
7Moreover, as the manager knows that whenever she does not observe any information regarding the
state of the economy, neither of the task-level shocks has been classified as ’exceptional’. By construction,
the adopted information restriction mechanism in this article leaves the expected value of all task-level
shocks unchanged regardless of what magnitude of z the owner chooses (see Section 1.3.3 for a discussion).
For this result, however, it suffices that the mechanism is the same for both θ1 and θ2.
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truthful representations of the objective world. Moreover, the model’s results are not
dependant on this particular formulation of the manager’s salience distortion. In Chap-
ter B, I show that all results also go through under continuous salience distortions.
1.3.3 Critical discussion
In the current setup, either information regarding states of both tasks or neither is
conferred to the manager depending on whether at least one of those states is considered
’exceptional’ or not, respectively. In assessing the desirability of this form of information
management, it is compared to a lucid benchmark, namely a regime of unconditional
full information disclosure.
Although the owner can restrict the manager’s access to information, it is important
that he cannot fabricate or misrepresent it. Otherwise, the owner could anticipate the
manager’s bias and present the information in exactly such a way that the decision-bias
and report-distortion would cancel each other out. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) have
encountered the same issue in a delegation problem. I will follow them by assuming
that, although information can be withheld, any information the manager does receive
can be freely verified and/or there are sufficient penalties for lying.
The symmetry of the information restriction device around 0 mirrors the symme-
try of the density function g(θs) (see Assumption 1). Hence, if in any given case the
manager’s information is, in fact, restricted and she must form expectations over the
task-level shocks θs, she knows the density function’s feasible support is symmetrically
bounded. But even if she can perfectly observe the owner’s choice of z, her unconditional
expectation still remains her best bet for any possible z:
E[θs|z] = E[θs] ∀z, θs ∀s (1.5)
Therefore, the manager’s reasoning specified in condition 1.3 still remains valid if she is
aware of the fact that her information inflow is restricted in the manner described above.
The manager is unaware of her own decision-bias, meaning she acts as if she is
convinced that δ̂ = 1. Note that in this setting the manager also has no incentive to
strategically threaten the owner with choosing a bad alternative in order to gain full
information. As she is convinced of herself not being biased, she will expect the same
judgement from the owner and interpret any attempts to restrict her information as a
trembling-hand strategy, since a rational owner would always choose z = 0 if δ̂ → 1 (see
Proposition 1). Second, any threats she might make in order to categorically ensure full
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information are not credible due to the game being one-shot and sequential. Once the
owner has made his choice it is in the manager’s best interest to attempt maximising
profits given the information she has.8
Generally, the considered mechanism of flagging exception is not the only possible
one. For example, the owner may consider only conveying information on the state
considered exceptional or convey only information on the most exceptional state while
not disclosing information regarding the other state at all. In the case of an exception
actually occurring, meaning under management-by-feedback, the manager would then
evaluate a certain outcome against an uncertain one when deciding whether to adapt
task s = 1 or adapt task s = 2. Bordalo et al. (2012) formulate an approach determining
which states attain saliency in the decision-makers mind for choices involving uncertain
outcomes.
However, this approach is not suitable for the given setup for several reasons. Most
importantly, it is not well-defined for decision-problems involving several dimensions,
such as the two task-level shocks θ1 and θ2 in this paper. While in Bordalo et al. (2013),
the decision-maker compares each realisation to its own reference value to determine the
salient dimension, in Bordalo et al. (2012) the decision-makers compares realisations with
each other to determine the salient state. It is unclear how such computations could be
carried out and interpreted. Assigning saliency to states is also not specified when there
are infinitely many possible states of the world. Apart from the technical inapplicability,
the necessary reflections involved on the side of the decision-maker to generate saliency
when (even finitely) many states exist arguably are unintuitive. Therefore, I opt to focus
on full disclosure of all information in case of information transmission.
The proposed mechanism for information transmission further is intuitive and easy
to implement. It can be seen as an ’alert-system’, that either leaves the manager undis-
turbed or issues a review of the environment if potential danger is detected. In different
contexts, similar mechanisms have been proposed by Reis (2004) and Andries and Had-
8An interesting problem arises if the owner is aware of her own decision bias, but does not know the
exact value of δ̂. In order to improve her decision-making, she could then attempt to infer the magnitude
of her bias from the owner’s action and correct her perceptions accordingly. Under the assumption of
the task-level shocks θs (see Assumption 3) being standard normally distributed, perfect knowledge of
the owner’s action (for all z > 0) is sufficient to perfectly inform her of her bias, as for given β1, β2 and
λ (which are known by the manager), every degree of management-by-exception is uniquely rationalised
by a single value of δ̂. If the owner does not observe z directly, she may still make inferences from
information she receives given her knowledge of the structure of the decision-problem. In particular, if
she does not observe any information on the state of the economy, she will infer that she must have some
δ̂ < 1, but cannot make use of this knowledge since there exist no perceptions to correct. If, on the other
hand, she does receive information regarding the task-level shocks, she can infer that z < max{|θ1|, |θ2|}
and hence some lower bound on δ̂. Further assumptions on the manager’s prior regarding her bias and
an underlying distribution of it could lead to a further formalisation of this problem and may be an
interesting avenue for further studies.
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dad (2019). Its relative simplicity may make it particularly suitable for applied contexts
while also ensuring precision in the results. These gains are traded-off with concessions
in generality. In particular, considering further conditions for information disclosure
may prove an interesting avenue for future research, such as non-symmetrical intervals
for flagging exceptions as well as even more complex devices, but are considered outside
the scope of this paper.
1.3.4 Construction of indirect profit function
Figure 1.2 depicts the manager’s choice correspondence under all possible scenarios of
the world. Anticipating this, the owner can express the expected profits as a tractable
function of z. Due to the symmetry with respect to θ1 and θ2 of both the profit and the
density function g( · ) around 0, the bounds of the integrals can be mirrored arbitrarily
around both θs axes. We can thus restrict the focus of the investigation to positive
values of θ1 and θ2. I arrive at the following expression:

































g(θ1) · g(θ2) · (β1θλ1 − β2θλ2 ) dθ2 dθ1
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Management-by-exception implemented by flow of information. Under ”nor-
mal” conditions, the manager adheres to the ex ante optimal plan without
regard to the state of the economy. If sufficiently unusual events occur, a
briefing is called and the firm is managed by feedback.
As Figure 1.2 shows, the manager only chooses to adapt task s = 2 if she manages-
by-feedback and both |θ1| < |θ2| and |θ1|( δ̂γ )
1
λ < |θ2| hold. Of the latter two conditions,
only one can be binding at any given time. For the sake of analytical simplicity, I
can therefore replace the min{ ·}- and max{ ·}-operator by substituting the δ̂ in the
expression above with the following parameter:
Definition 4. δ := max{γ, δ̂}
Importantly, values for δ̂ lower than γ are not excluded from the analysis, but simply
do not have any effect on it. I can then take the derivative of E[π(z)] with respect to
z. Applying Leibniz’ Rule of Integration twice yields the following expression of the




= 4 · g(z) ·
∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0
g(θ1) · (β1θλ1 − β2zλ) dθ1 (1.6)
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1.4 Management-by-Exception as a Dominant
Strategy
In this section, I theoretically map out relevant factors in the adoption choice of the
management practice management-by-exception, yielding testable predictions while also
potentially shedding light on earlier findings. To this end, I conduct the investigation
with an inherently binary view on the owner’s action space, by determining sufficient
conditions when he will optimally choose a strictly positive value for z as opposed to
choosing z = 0. By Definition 1 this corresponds to management-by-exception being
implemented at least to some degree. Although this analysis lacks precision, it retains
generality, as it is done under the minimal assumptions specified in Assumption 1. In
the following section I will show that maximum precision can be obtained with further
assumptions on the distribution of the economy’s state.
First, it is helpful to establish some properties of the following function:
k(z) ≡
z · g((γδ )
1
λ z)∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0 g(θ1) dθ1
(1.7)
defined on the domain z ∈ (0,∞).
Lemma 1. The function k
(i) is continuous.






Before proceeding, note that since the density function g( · ) is, by Assumption 1,
continuous and symmetric around 0, it holds that 4 · g(z) > 0 in the vicinity of z = 0.
Therefore ∂π∂z ≥ 0 if and only if
f(z) :=
∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0
g(θ1) · (β1yλ1 − β2zλ) dθ1 ≥ 0 (1.8)
Characterising f(z) is thus equivalent to characterising the gradient of the expected
profits in the vicinity of z = 0. The following finding provides a tool for doing so.







Before deriving the main result, it is helpful to make two observations. First, by an
application of the Combination Theorem for Continuous Functions, the slope of the profit
function is continuous at all z ∈ [0,∞). Hence, although the function k(z) is not defined
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at z = 0 itself, the function of main interest ∂E[π(z)]∂z on which inferences are made is
defined and well-behaved at this point. Second, note that ∂E[π(z)]∂z |z=0 = 0 for all feasible
settings. Therefore, if the slope of the expected profits increases when increasing z from
0, it becomes positive. In this case, expected profits also rise by increasing z from z = 0,
rendering z = 0 (not implementing management-by-exception) a dominated alternative.
If, on the other hand, the slope of the expected profits decreases at all strictly positive
z, the owner would prefer choosing z = 0. Using these insights, it is easy to first verify
a rather technical insight.
Proposition 1. Management-by-exception is only adopted if there is a behavioural bias
in the manager’s decision-making (δ̂ < 1).
This stems from the fact that, within the model, the manager’s inclination to miseval-
uate her available information is the sole driver for implementing
management-by-exception. Specifically, her behavioural bias causes her to mispriori-
tise the firm’s tasks and fail to direct the organisational focus to the most important
areas. By effectively introducing rigid plans on ex ante optimal strategies, the man-
ager’s misprioritisation through ’over-responsiveness’ can be reversed, however, at the
cost of misprioritisation through ’under-responsiveness’. If for some ranges of moder-
ate realisations of the task-level shocks θ1 and θ2 the first effect dominates the second,
management-by-exception at least to some degree improves prioritisation and should
thus be adopted.
As stated earlier, the model does not claim exclusiveness. There may well be further
motivations for implementing the management technique, such as costly information
transmission. It appears to be a relevant objective, though, since the practician (Mack-
intosh, 1978, p. 96) in the chapter ”Activating the system that spotlights the biggest
problems” concerning management-by-exception states: ’Many times management will
commit the entire company to a drive for the elimination of what it conceives to be major
operating problems. All too often, however, these drives are initiated with inadequate or
partial information (...), and result in little more than a futile, misguided expenditure of
time and effort.’
Crucially, using the insights from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is possible to derive a
condition for when management-by-exception should be adopted.
Proposition 2. For all distributions of the task-level shocks θ1 and θ2 satisfying As-
sumption 1 the firm adopts management-by-exception if λ · δ1−δ < 1.
From this result, I will now state and discuss the comparative statics with respect
19
to the model’s underlying parameters. For all following Corollaries, I shall state that
an adoption of management-by-exception becomes ’more likely’ if a change in a certain
parameter will cause the condition specified in Proposition 2 to hold for a strictly larger
range of the remaining parameters.
Corollary 1. Ceteris paribus, a stronger bias in the manager’s decision making (lower
δ̂) makes an adoption of management-by-exception more likely.
This result provides a possible explanation for some previous, puzzling empirical
findings. It has long been surmised that ’in high-risk conditions where safety is of con-
cern, active management-by-exception may play a more prominent and effective role’
(Antonakis et al., 2003, p. 270). Bass and Avolio (2000) corroborate this by studying
the performance of U.S. Army platoons. They find large positive effects of management-
by-exception on a unit’s readiness. This may be a result of leaders finding it difficult to
maintain cold and objective decision-making in contexts that are fast-paced and poten-
tially life-threatening. The more this is the case, the more they may benefit from rigid
protocols that are followed irrespective of the situation’s developments unless sufficiently
exceptional circumstances arise.
Apart from contextual factors that may lead to the adoption of management-by-
exception, there may be manager-specific determinants, too. (Antonakis et al., 2003, p.
274) remark that ’men tend to use management-by-exception more often than do women’.
It is a well-established finding that men are generally more overconfident than women
(e.g. Barber and Odean, 2008). The stronger prevalence of the management technique
may be due to mirroring, gender-specific phenomena regarding overreactions to salient
stimuli.
Corollary 2. Ceteris paribus, a stronger valuation of extreme events in the manager’s
decision making (higher λ) makes an adoption of management-by-exception less likely.
Perhaps surprisingly, although management-by-exception appears to do well in dan-
gerous, high-stakes environments, a higher weight on extreme outcomes makes the tech-
nique less attractive for the firm. If outliers become more important, then a more
sensitive policy (,i.e. a lower z) will be desired so that more events can be dealt with
individually rather than via a rigid plan. Although some studies such as Bernile et al.
(2017) tie corporate policies back to risk attitudes, surprisingly little research has been
done examining the adoption choice of management-by-exception towards such senti-
ments.
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Corollary 3. Ceteris paribus, a stronger polarisation in the ex ante importance across
the firm’s tasks (lower γ) makes an adoption of management-by-exception more likely.
The desirability of management-by-exception increases if the ex ante quality of the
plan rises. To illustrate this point, consider a firm where β2 → 0 so that γ → 0. It
will then never be optimal for the manager to adapt task s = 2. Management-by-plan
will then always select the best strategy, thus increasing the desirability of a highly rigid
management-by-exception policy. This result reflects findings from Dessein et al. (2016);
in a similar functional setting where there are limits on information transmission within
the firm, the authors find that an increased ex-ante importance of already important
tasks may make it desirable to make the organisation more rigid by managing more of the
firm’s tasks by plan. However, while in their setup this outcome is static and independent
of the economy’s state, under management-by-exception the firm will always revert to
management-by-feedback if sufficiently exceptional circumstances arise.
Since with the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire survey there already exists a
highly used, common tool to elicit the model’s main variable, the major challenge for
empirical estimations of the model’s predictions lies in identifying and constructing mea-
sures of the key parameters γ, δ̂ and λ. Firm’s accounting posts of different divisions may
provide proxies for imbalances of costs across its products’ dimensions (γ). Concerning
the remaining drivers, there is a large literature in linking the adoption of manage-
ment practices to psychometric indicators of the leaders (see Bono and Judge, 2004,
for a meta-analysis). Moreover, in 2015 the updated version of the large-scale Manage-
ment and Organizational Practices Survey has acknowledged the importance of proper
decision-making as well as utilising correct information inputs to do so, by including the
new section data and decision-making. In a similar vein, eliciting personal or contextual
risk- and salience sentiments may prove insightful.
1.5 Existence and Uniqueness of Optimal
Degree of Management-by-Exception
In this section, I will show that what the firm should treat as ’exceptional ’ and what
as ’usual ’ can be precisely defined if one is willing to place further assumptions on the
distribution function of the state of the economy g( · ).9 For the remainder of the article
9The conception and formulation of this proof has greatly benefited from extensive discussions with
Bram Driesen.
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2 ≡ φ(θs) ∀s (1.9)
As this assumption constitutes a special case of the previous set placed on the distri-
bution of the task-level shocks (Assumption 1), all results from Proposition 2 still obtain
under the current setting. However, it is now possible to derive additional properties of
the function k(z) (see Equation (1.7)).
Lemma 3. The function k
(i) is continuous.






(iii) satisfies limz→∞ k(z) = 0.
(iv) is strictly decreasing in z.
The first two items ensure that under certain conditions there is a segment where the
firm’s profit rises when z is increased marginally from 0, yielding the previous section’s
main result. Items three and four further ensure that either the firm’s profits mono-
tonically decrease with z, or the profit function can be separated into a rising segment
(for low z) and a decreasing segment (for high z). These findings are also illustrated by
Figure A.1 in the appendix.
Given these insights, it is possible to obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. If the task-level shocks θ1 and θ2 are standard normally distributed,
there exists a uniquely optimal degree of implementing management-by-exception for all
possible firms.
In order to develop intuition for the qualitative and quantitative behaviour of the
model with respect to its underlying parameters, I conduct a short simulation exercise.
Although a closed-form solution for z does not exist, the owner’s optimal action can be
solved for numerically with arbitrary precision. Due to the additional insight in Lemma 3
(iv), Lemma 2 now dissects the owner’s expected profit function with respect to z into
either a single falling and a single rising segment or instead causes it to be falling at all
z > 0. In any case, the function will be single-peaked. Therefore, the optimal z must
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Figure 1.3: Simulated illustration of optimal organisational responses with respect to
the model’s deep parameters.
(a) δ̂ = 0.25 (b) δ̂ = 0.35
(c) δ̂ = 0.45 (d) δ̂ = 0.55
Increasing firm rigidity, measured by the optimal share of activities managed
by plan (see Equation (1.10)), with increasing overresponsiveness of the
manager (δ̂), stronger polarisation of ex ante importance of tasks (γ) and
stronger convexity of costs with respect to shocks (λ).
be located between two values where the slope of the expected profit function changes
its sign. Starting from 0, I simulate this slope for all z in small steps and pick the first
z where a change of sign occurs as the optimal solution.
To further facilitate interpretation, I express the owner’s optimal solution as the
expected share of the firm’s activities dealt with via management-by-plan, henceforth
denoted %MBP (z∗):
%MBP (z∗) ≡ Φ2−sidedθ1,θ2 (z
∗) = Φ2−sidedθ1 (z









This formulation intuitively picks up on the notion that higher levels of z correspond to
a more rigid organisation (see Definition 1). As z increases, the share of events dealt
with via a static plan without regard to the state of the world also increases, whereas at
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z = 0 all management is done case-by-case.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the solutions of Equation (1.10) for some exemplary parametric
settings. Echoing the findings from Proposition 2, for each λ there exists a double
threshold with respect to δ̂ and γ above which management-by-exception will not be
implemented. However, as soon this threshold is crossed, the firm’s drive to implement
the practice rises sharply. For example, for λ = 1 and the manager’s bias with δ̂ = 0.45
just below the required threshold the firm already executes around 80% of its activities
by plan if one task is three times more important than the other, making the firm very
rigid. Although the exact values elicited should be taken with care, they suggest that
the investigated underlying factors may, in fact, shape organisational structures in an
economically meaningful way.
1.6 Conclusion
Although management-by-exception is a well-established concept enjoying
widespread use in practice in a large variety of fields, this paper is the first to lay out a
mathematical framework in order study the technique with theoretical rigour. I derive
two main conclusions. First, under relatively mild assumptions I obtain a simple, suffi-
cient condition for when firms will adopt management-by-exception. Second, I show that
there exists a uniquely optimal degree of implementing management-by-exception with
respect to the underlying parameters if the state of the economy is standard normally
distributed.
Testing the model’s predictions is an obvious next step for future research (see Sec-
tion 1.4 for a discussion). Theoretically, it may be interesting to see how a growing
number of tasks, interpretable as a growing firm size, would affect the adoption choice
of management-by-exception as well as how these drivers would interact with the ones
established in this paper. Further, it may be interesting whether other established psy-
chological biases, such as overconfidence or confirmatory bias, on the part of the manager




A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) As all of z, g(z) and
∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0 g(θ1) dθ1 are continuous functions everywhere, by the
Combination Theorem for Continuous Functions it holds that k(z) is also continuous
everywhere.
(ii) As k(0) = 00 and both its numerator and denominator are differentiable every-













































≥ 1. Since λ > 0, we must have that
limz→0 k(z) ≥ 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2




















∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0
g(θ1) dθ1 (A.2)
Then for z > 0 and 1 > γ > 0, setting f ′(z) ≥ 0 and rearranging yields the desired
condition.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Since, in this paper, the manager’s behavioural bias is the sole driver for the owner’s
motivation to adopt management-by-exception, doing so can never be desirable when no
such bias exists. It is easy to verify this. By Lemma 2, f(z) and thus ∂E[π]∂z decreases






1−δ . If the manager’s decision bias vanishes as δ̂ → 1
(and thus δ → 1), the right-hand side goes to ∞ and the inequality must hold for all z.
Coupled with the insight that ∂E[π]∂z |z=0 = 0, this implies that in this case
∂E[π]
∂z < 0 for
all z and that the owner can increase expected profits by decreasing z from all strictly
positive levels.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2






. When z → 0 it then holds that






1−δ if and only if 1 > λ ·
δ
1−δ . Due to the parsimonious assumptions
placed on g( · ) so far, not much can be said about the behaviour of k(z) as z increases.






1−δ , where z̃ may be arbitrarily
large. If then 1 > λ · δ1−δ holds with strict inequality and since by Lemma 1 (i) k(z)
is continuous, there must be a range (0, z̃) with some strictly positive length where it






1−δ . By Lemma 2, this also implies that f
′(z) > 0
for the entire range. Because ∂E[π]∂z |z=0 = 0, this further implies that
∂E[π]
∂z > 0 for all
z ∈ (0, z̃). In this case, starting from z = 0 the owner can then increase expected profits
by increasing z up to z̃, rendering z = 0 a strictly dominated strategy for the owner. If,













1−δ for all z and all z > 0 are better than z = 0.
Therefore, if 1 > λ · δ1−δ then not implementing management-by-exception to any degree
by choosing z = 0 is a strictly dominated strategy.
A.5 Proof of Corollaries 1-3
The comparative statics results can be directly gained from the dominance condition
in Proposition 2. Not implementing management-by-exception is a strictly dominated
option if λ · δ1−δ < 1. Ceteris paribus, this condition is more likely to hold if either λ
or δ decrease. Recall, however, that by Definition 4, δ is bounded from below by the
maximum of the parameters δ̂ and γ. Hence, for a decrease in one of the two parameters
to affect the adoption choice, the other one must be sufficiently low.
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
(i) See Proof of Lemma 1.
(ii) See Proof of Lemma 1.
(iii) To show the desired result, I determine the limits of the numerator and de-
nominator of k(z) individually. For the denominator, note that because of symme-
try of φ( · ) coupled with the fact that φ( · ) is a density function, it must hold that∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0 φ(θi) dθi =
1
2 > 0.
For the numerator, first note that it must hold that limz→∞
∫ z
0 φ(θi)θi dθi < ∞,
since by symmetry of φ( · ) (Assumption 1 (iii)) we would otherwise also have that
limz→−∞
∫ 0
z φ(θi)θidθi = −∞. In that case, however, E[θi] would not exist, contradicting
Assumption 1 (i).
With this in mind, I will prove the desired result by contradiction, assuming that
limz→∞ k(z) = C > 0 where C is some finite, strictly positive constant. Then for
all ε > 0, there exists a positive number M such that for all θi > M it holds that
|φ(θi)·θi−C| < ε. Therefore, for all θi > M it must also hold that C−ε < φ(θi)·θi < C+ε.











which contradicts the initial finding. As C cannot be negative, I conclude that it must
hold that C = 0.








(iv) Define the function
l(z) :=
∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0
φ(θ1) dθ1























(∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0 φ(θ1) dθ1
)
< 0 for all z > 0. Hence,
it must hold that l(z) < 0 for all z > 0.
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Figure A.1: Illustration of findings from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.




















(∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0 g(θ1) dθ1
)2
> 0 and l(z) < 0 for all z > 0, it holds
that k′(z) < 0 for all z > 0.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof builds on the findings from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, which are illustrated





1−δ and k(z) (see Equation (1.7)). Since the former is a constant and the latter,
by Lemma 3 (i) and (iv), is continuous and strictly decreasing in z, there can either be
no crossing or exactly one crossing between the two. I will discuss both possible cases
in order.






1−δ if and only
if λ · δ1−δ > 1. However, since by Lemma 3 (iv) k(z) is strictly decreasing in z when
θ1 and θ2 are drawn from a standard normal distribution, then this also implies that






1−δ for all z. In turn, by Lemma 2 this implies that f
′(z) < 0 for
28
all z, which, coupled with the fact that f(0) = 0, implies that f(z) < 0 for all z. As
characterising the sign of f(z) is equivalent to characterising the slope of the expected
profits, we know from this that ∂E[π]∂z < 0 for all z. Therefore, if λ ·
δ
1−δ > 1 the owner can
increase expected profits by decreasing z from all strictly positive levels. The uniquely
optimal level for z is then at the its lowest possible level z = 0.







limz→∞ k(z), where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3 (ii) and the second from
Lemma 3 (iii) (for all feasible parametric settings). Continuity of k(z) (Lemma 3 (i)),
by the intermediate value theorem, ensures that there is at least one crossing between






1−δ while the fact that k(z) is strictly decreasing k(z) (Lemma 3 (iv))













1−δ and by Lemma 2 that f
′(z) > 0.
Since furthermore f(0) = 0, it then holds that f(z) > 0 and thus that ∂E[π]∂z > 0 for
all z ∈ [0, z̃). As in Proposition 2, the owner can strictly increase the firm’s expected
profits by increasing z at all z ∈ [0, z̃) whenever λ · δ1−δ < 1. However, because of the
single-crossing property, it now also holds that the slope of the expected profits decreases
for all z ∈ (z̃,∞).
In order to ensure that a maximum is reached for some z, we now simply need
to ensure that f(z), and therefore the slope of the expected profits, does indeed turn
negative at some point as z increases. This can be verified as follows.
lim
z→∞
f(z) = β1 lim
z→∞




1 dθ1 − β2 limz→∞ z
λ
∫ ( γδ ) 1λ z
0
φ(θ1) dθ1 = −∞ (A.6)
As noted in the proof for Lemma 3 (iii), limz→∞
∫ z
0 φ(θ1)θ1 dθ1 converges to a finite
constant. Since 0 < δ, γ, λ < ∞, so must the first addend. It is then easy to see that
the second addend goes to −∞, showing the desired result. Therefore, there must be
some z∗ > z̃ for which it holds that ∂E[π]∂z > 0 for all z ∈ [0, z
∗) and ∂E[π]∂z < 0 for all
z ∈ (z∗,∞). Therefore, there also exists a unique level of z that maximises the firm’s





For simplicity, I work with rank-based salience distortions in this paper, so that the man-
ager’s evaluation becomes deflated by a constant proportion for the less salient option.
However, the results are not dependant on this exclusive formulation. Alternatively, the
manager’s decision distortion may also be stronger for increasingly unusual shocks she
perceives.
Consider a manager that manages by feedback, choosing to adapt task 1 (m=1) if
and only if
−β2 · |θ2|(1−δ) · |θ2|λ ≥ −β1 · |θ1|(1−δ) · |θ1|λ (B.1)
This constitutes an alternative formulation to condition (1.4) in the main paper,
inspired by Appendix C of Bordalo et al. (2013).
All of the paper’s Lemmas and Propositions still hold in this case. When constructing
the indirect profit function, no redefinition of the distortion parameter δ is necessary, as
now there are no case distinctions in determining which option receives the distortion.
A segment where ∂E[π(z)]∂z > 0 is then introduced whenever
z · g(γ
1













It is easy to verify that the condition’s right-hand side goes to infinity both when




Excessive Stock Trading: More or
Less? Or Both?
2.1 Introduction
Private households that participate in the stock market trade a lot. Excessive trading,
through its various associated costs such as commission fees and bid-ask spreads, incurs
sizeable losses. Barber et al. (2008) estimate that in Taiwan such losses are equivalent
to 2.2% of gross domestic product. Similar behaviour has been documented in the U.S.
(Barber and Odean, 2000), Canada (Linnainmaa et al., 2018) and Sweden (Dahlquist
et al., 2016).1 Despite this being a prevalent and well-documented phenomenon, little
research has been done on how to counter this behaviour. Some scholars (see Huber et
al., 2012; Hanke et al., 2010) have explored the impact of ’Tobin-like’ taxes on market
outcomes and individual behaviour in various settings. To the best of my knowledge,
this article is the first to examine information management as a tool to curb excessive
trading.
In particular, I present evidence from a computer laboratory experiment. In the
experiment, participants engage in speculative trading tasks on the basis of real-life
stock data where they are incentivised to realise the highest possible returns. In each
instance, they can either choose to keep an allocated stock and receive its returns or
pay a commission fee in order to swap their stock for another one if they fear that the
1The authors examine individual investors that trading the umbrella of a Swedish Pensions Agency,
where all transaction costs are collectively borne by the fund. Although highly active investors individ-
ually outperform inactive ones, the overall impact of such active trading on the fund’s net returns is
negative and large.
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stock will incur large losses. To inform this choice, participants may receive the return
performance history of their allocated stock.
Figure 2.1 shows that in this context the same qualitative phenomenon noted in ear-
lier work emerges: when ordering investors into quintiles according to trading activity,
no clear pattern emerges regarding the gross returns earned. However there is a clear
monotonic trend of decreasing net returns (gross returns minus trading costs) with in-
creasing trading activity. The aim of this paper is to explore the propensity of two pure
information interventions in curbing excessive trading and increasing net returns.
Figure 2.1: Stylized replication of Barber and Odean (2000).
(a) Evidence from Barber and Odean (2000)
(b) Experimental evidence.
Several studies during the last two decades have made progress in explaining the
’excessive trading puzzle’ both theoretically and empirically. One strand of literature
attempts to explain the behavioural pattern as an outcome of a rational decision-making
process. Seru et al. (2009) argue that costs associated with high trading volumes are
a symptom explorative learning by unexperienced traders. On the hand, this includes
familiarisation with a new environment, such as establishing thorough knowledge of
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all relevant parameters and calibrating prediction models with increased experience, in
order to improve the expected returns from trading over time. On the other hand,
this includes familiarisation with one’s own ability. Grinblatt et al. (2012) show that
the returns of individual traders vary greatly with their inherent ability, measured by
their IQ. For excessive trading in particular, Cronqvist and Siegel (2014) find from
a twin study that genetics account for a large share of variation in net returns from
trading when accounting for other factors. Traders who discover their own ineptitude
from past experience may then ”stop trading actively, choosing instead to invest in a
passive investment” (Seru et al., 2009, p. 706). While the authors indeed find that this
second type of learning is the dominant driver of return improvements over time in their
sample, Barber et al. (2020) contest this view by showing that losses from trading are
both prevalent and persistent in a separate dataset.
I introduce a treatment to test this hypothesis, henceforth called the Detailed Feed-
back Treatment. In previous observational studies, traders voluntarily opt into gathering
experience by deciding to trade more or less actively. While this choice itself may be
driven by the trader’s underlying ability, it may also be driven by a host of other factors.
This complicates a clean estimation of the effect of experience on trading outcomes, in
particular trading activity and returns. In a controlled experimental environment, it
is possible to randomly administer experience by providing participants with detailed
feedback on how their actions impact the outcomes of interest at every stage, what their
outcome would have been if they had chosen differently as well as a prompt of whether
they have chosen the most profitable option in a given instance. This enrichment of the
participants’ information sets increases the salience of key parameters in the decision-
making environment and makes it easy to discover prolonged poor performances caused
by overly active trading.
Another strand of literature regards excessive trading as a mistake driven by psycho-
logical distortions in perception. Odean (1998a) presents a model where investors over-
weight incoming information and underweight their prior information. This additional
information may then cause overreactions to changes in the environment of the investors
and consequently lead to inflated trading volumes. Previous studies have compiled ev-
idence corroborating this view both in the laboratory and with real-life transactional
data (see section 2.4.1 for a further discussion). It remains elusive, however, how such
investors could improve their returns from trading. Increased experience, as suggested
by Seru et al. (2009), may not lead to the acquisition of correct knowledge if the learning
models of the traders are misspecified.
33
I propose a novel, second treatment to address this question, henceforth called the
Information Filter Treatment. Instead of providing the participants with further infor-
mation, I reduce the participants’ access to information on changes in their environment,
namely the information of their allocated stock’s previous performance. Although com-
mon wisdom dictates that, in individual decision-making, more information cannot lead
to worse outcomes, this need not hold true for individuals who make mistakes in process-
ing information. In this scenario, incoming information may ‘tempt’ investors away from
the correct. For example, while in many cases a simple buy-and-hold strategy may be
most profitable for amateur investors, individuals may fall victim to panic-sales if they
observe a recent history of bad returns or try to capitalise on upswings. These investors
may then improve their trading outcomes, by being shielded from such information.
Both experimental treatments individually can provide insight on the potential causes
of overtrading and how to counter them effectively. It remains unclear, however, whether
the two respective (potential) causes for excessive trading are independent channels or
to which extent they overlap. On one hand, individuals incorrectly evaluating incoming
information may profit particularly much from a chance to discover their erroneous de-
cision mechanism through increased feedback. On the other hand, such individuals may
be particularly overoptimistic regarding their ability to improve their trading outcomes
via smart strategy adjustments and thus be particularly resistant to feedback. The ex-
periment’s overlapping treatment design is capable of addressing these concerns. Apart
from experimental groups receiving the two respective treatments individually, a further
experimental group receives both treatments. This allows to detect potential overlaps
of two individual effects and check for potential interactions between the two.
The considered interventions lead to large and significant changes in behaviour. The
Detailed Feedback and Information Filter Treatment achieve reductions in trading ac-
tivity of 13% and 17%, respectively. These results are consistent with the explana-
tion of both inexperience as well as mistakes in information processing mistakes being
drivers in excessive trading. Accordingly, these changes in behaviour are accompanied
by the expected changes in net returns, with the Detailed Feedback and Information
Filter Treatments leading to sizeable increases in net returns of 0.42 and 0.33 percentage
points. Moreover, the combined treatment shows virtually no interaction effects between
the two individual treatments in the behaviour of the participants. Thus, these findings
point towards both channels of excessive trading being independent drivers in creating
the phenomenon, acting alongside each other.
These results provide new insights regardig the value of information in individual
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stock-trading. In an interactive market setup, Huber (2007) finds that average-informed
traders perform the most poorly, while trading profits significantly increase with de-
creasing as well as increasing levels of information. The returns on information in such a
setting may thus be non-monotonic. My results corroborate the view that traders may
do better when receiving richer as well as poorer information. Crucially, however, the
two interventions concern different types of information. Considering that their effects
stack, my results suggest that distinct informational stimuli affect decision-making via
independent channels rather than people acting on their overall informedness.
Moreover, I use personal information from the experiment’s follow-up questionnaire
to investigate the channels of overtrading. My analysis confirms previous studies (Biais
et al., 2005; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009) that identify overconfidence and gambling
activity as major drivers. On the other hand, contrary to Barber and Odean (2001) I
do not find any link between a participant’s gender and their level of overconfidence.
In fact, male participants tend to trade less than women. Also, the treatment effects
on participants’ trading profits do not appear to arise from encouraging more risky
portfolios as in Gneezy and Potters (1997). Instead, my results seem to stem from a
novel channel of information management on trading outcomes.
At a practical level, my findings may be of interest to private individuals and pro-
fessionals alike. Since the discussed experimental interventions solely concern which
information should be presented when, they can easily be imitated on home computers
with limited technical proficiency. These interventions could be implemented decentrally
by households themselves or even offered as tools and applications by trading platforms
or financial regulatory bodies acting in the public interest. Linnainmaa et al. (2018)
further show that professional financial advisors may be subject to the same biases and
mistakes as laymen, leading to high-cost overtrading both on behalf of their clients as
well as within their personal portfolios, leaving room for my proposed interventions to
exert benefits.
This article is organised as follows. The remainder of this section reviews related
literature. Section 2.2 discusses the experimental design, provides a descriptive analysis
of the data and verifies the success of the experiment’s randomisation. Section 2.3
presents the experiment’s main results, while Section 2.4 discusses possible channels.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Tobin (1978) famously proposed to counter excessive trading volumes by introducing a
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financial transaction tax. Although his recommendation was targeted towards interna-
tional money markets, Keynes (1936) argued for the same in the domain of stock trading,
receiving further theoretical foundation from Palley (1999).
This paper, on the other hand, attempts to achieve the same effect solely by deliber-
ately choosing which information to supply to and which information to withhold from
the trader. In doing so, it aims at averting losses incurred from overtrading and thus
increase profits. Fama (1970)’s hypotheses on information efficiency provide a bench-
mark for the impact of information on stock trading outcomes. He states that prices
‘fully reflect all available information at all times’ (p. 385). Therefore, all variations of
additional information should not have an effect on trading behaviour.
Findings from numerous studies dispute this hypothesis. In zero-sum market games,
better-informed individuals can profit by exploiting worse-informed individuals, show-
ing that gathering information can, indeed, incur benefits (Copeland and Friedman,
1992). Importantly, such gains need not be monotonic in the level of information. In
an experimental setup with multiple levels of informedness, Huber et al. (2008) show
that only the best-informed traders can profit from their informational advantage, while
in Huber (2007) average-informed traders obtain significantly lower returns than the
worst-informed. On financial markets, less information can be better.
However, as these studies were carried out in zero-sum settings where trading gains
are shifted across traders, their predictions have no bite in contexts where individuals
trade in a non-interactive manner as price-takers on financial markets. Blackwell (1951)
provides a well-known theoretical argument for individual decision-making, claiming
generally that a rational prediction procedure can never perform better with less in-
formation. But these results need not hold true if individuals incorporate information
incorrectly into their decision-making. Recent studies have accumulated rich evidence
suggesting that this may indeed be true for individuals on the stock market. Frydman
and Wang (2019), making use of a natural experiment, show that changes in stock price
salience, while leaving available information unchanged, increases investors’ tendencies
to sell winning stocks and hold on to losers. Biais et al. (2005) provide evidence from a
computer laboratory experiment, linking participants’ overconfidence with their trading
behaviour.
Given these insights, surprisingly little research has been done on how systematic
changes in information management may affect trading behaviour in non-interactive
contexts. As an early example one may consider Benartzi and Thaler (1995), showing
theoretically that if stock traders are both myopic and loss-averse, they tend to select
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excessively non-risky portfolios with detrimental effects to their trading profits. Con-
ducting a direct experimental test of the theory, Gneezy and Potters (1997) show that
this tendency can be reversed by decreasing the frequency in which subjects receive
performance updates on their allotted portfolios. Through the channel of more risky
portfolios, restricted access to information leads to significant increases in returns. An-
dries and Haddad (2019) further argue theoretically that individuals may benefit from
deliberately restricting their access to information for purely affective reasons. Loss
averse traders, despite losing out on returns, may enjoy net-utility benefits from less
frequent updates on their portfolio performances. With this article, I hope to contribute
to this discussion.
2.2 Experimental Design
In order to study the impact of varying information sets on trading outcomes in stock
markets, I conduct a computer laboratory experiment. All experimental treatments
will merely vary the information which participants receive while leaving everything else
unchanged. I will therefore begin by explaining the commonalities throughout all of the
experiment’s iterations and then describe how the individual treatments differ in design.
Participants trade on the basis of real-life stock data, in particular monthly returns
from stocks listed on Standard and Poor’s 500 Index from January 1960 to July 2017 (all
data taken from the Bloomberg Terminal). At the beginning of each round, participants
are randomly allotted a random stock in a random month from the basket. For each
of these rounds, they must then make a binary stylised speculative trading decision:
they either hold their stock or trade it. I choose data from real-life stocks as the basis
for trading in the experiment in an attempt to ensure that insights from the computer
laboratory remain valid outside of it. In particular, there exists ample evidence that
excessive trading is linked with mistakes in expectation formation (i.e. overconfidence).
It is unclear to what degree such distortions would carry over to different data generating
processes, such as synthetic stock valuations drawn from pre-set distributions.2
If a participant decides to hold the stock, she will simply receive the returns of her
allotted stock for the allotted month. If, on the other hand, she decides to trade, she will
receive the returns for another random stock at a random month, while a fixed commis-
2For practical considerations, I further randomise the allocation of stocks in every period on the
individual level as opposed to, say, randomly determining a stock which all participants hold in a given
period. Monthly stock returns are highly volatile and a single outlier might otherwise have a large
impact on both the participants’ choice behaviour as well as their profits from trading. Randomising
provides some robustness towards such concerns, while not introducing a systematic bias towards any of
the experimental groups.
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sion fee of five percentage points will be deducted from her earnings for the round. The
net profits, denominated in percent of return, are then added to (or subtracted from) the
participant’s total earnings at the end of each round. At the end of the experiment, these
earnings are converted and paid out at a rate of 1% = £0.08. Participants receive an
additional fix reward of £6 for completing an experiment. Overall earnings are capped
from below at £6 and from above at £20. The average final payment for the experiment
was £6.90, which is roughly in line with the UK minimum wage for young adults at
the time the experiment was conducted. Participants who did well in the experiment
had the ability to substantially increase their payoffs. The standard deviation for final
payoffs is £2.18 and sereval participants earned more than £10 from the experiment,
providing ample incentives to engage with the experiment in trying to maximise mon-
etary payoffs. Moreover, as seen in Table 2.7, the participants’ choice behaviour is not
significantly driven by their initial level of wealth for the most favoured model specifica-
tion (significance further drops strongly when outliers are dropped). The experiment’s
monetary incentive effects therefore do not appear to abate with increasing wealth of
the participants.
In order to make this decision, participants in the control group receive information
on the past performance of their allocated stock. Specifically, they are shown a graph
of the returns the stock has yielded in each of the past 10 months (see Figure C.7 in
the appendix for an example). There are 30 rounds in the experiment and, up to the
accumulation of earnings across periods, all rounds are technically independent from
each other so that nothing the participant does in any given round may affect what will
happen in another. Also, all participants trade independently of another, so that they
may not affect each other.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, there are two treatments in the experiment implemented
in a 2× 2 design. All experimental groups are played in each session, where participants
are randomly allocated according to the four quadrants in Figure 2.2 and remain in
their given treatment for the entirety of the session. Following the main experiment,
all participants are asked to answer a short, non-incentivised follow-up questionnaire.
Personal characteristics elicited from the survey will be used to supplement the empirical
analysis (see Section 2.4).
In total, I conducted 18 sessions with a total of 352 participants. All sessions were
held in the University of Glasgow, with 15 sessions from October 2017 to February 2018
and 3 further sessions in February 2019. On average, sessions lasted about 60 minutes.
The experiment was fully computerised using z-Tree of Fischbacher (2007).
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Treatment I: Detailed Feedback
In this treatment, participants receive more information than the control group. In
particular, participants will receive detailed feedback after each round regarding their
performance (see Figure C.8 for an exemplary screen). Investors receive information on
the gross performance of their chosen option and the resulting net profits. Also, they are
told how much they would have earned if they would have chosen differently, including a
split of net profit posts. Finally, they are prompted with an explicit evaluation whether,
in the given instance, they have chosen the most profitable option or not.
Treatment II: Information Filter
In this treatment, participants receive less information than in the control group. In
particular, participants are subject to an algorithmic information filter which determines
whether they will receive information on their allotted stock’s performance history.
The discrimination on whether the participants receive this information is imple-
mented as follows: Each round, a random natural number z from 0 to 9 is drawn with
uniform probabilities. The algorithm then counts the successive run of either positive or
negative returns of the participant’s allotted stock for the given round, starting with the
most recent return. Let θ denote this number. For example, if the stock yielded positive
returns for the last three months preceded by a negative return, θ = 3. If conversely
the stock yielded negative returns successively for the last three months preceded by a
positive return, then also θ = 3. If the stock yielded positive returns for the last month
preceded by nine negative returns, then θ = 1.
The algorithm then compares z and θ. If θ > z, then the participant will indeed
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receive information on the stock’s past performance and the participant will follow per-
fectly the protocol of the control group for the round. If the converse holds true, with
θ ≤ z, then the participant will not receive any information on the allotted stock’s per-
formance, but will instead be told that information for the round has been restricted
(see Figure C.8 for a screen display). The algorithm therefore tends to flag exceptions
and suppress relatively moderate outcomes, subject to the random draw of z.
2.2.2 Data and Randomisation Check
Table 2.1 provides the means, standard deviation and minimum and maximum realisa-
tions of variables elicited in the experiment. Panel A lists variables on trading outcomes
elicited during the main experiment. Net Returns denotes the participants’ returns
earned in a given period from stocks minus commission fees subject to trading activity.
Gross Returns denotes the same outcome without deducting potential commission fees.
Trading denotes the participant’s choice in any given period to trade (coded with 1)
or not (coded with 0). As can be seen, net returns are highly volatile, featuring a low
absolute mean and a high standard deviation. This will make it difficult, although not
impossible, to find statistically significant effects on this outcome due to the substantial
noise.
Panel B in Table 2.1 lists select variables related to participants’ personal charac-
teristics, based on information in the experiment’s follow-up questionnaire. I will now
provide an account of how these measures are constructed, top to bottom. Screenshots
of all the underlying questions are available in the appendix (see chapter C). The vari-
able Male is coded with 1 if the participant reported to be male and 0 otherwise. Age
simply repeats the stated age. I follow the methodology of Holt and Laury (2002) to
elicit participants’ risk sentiment. Participants have to choose ten times between two
lotteries. For the Riskseeking Index, I count the number of risky choices and divide it by
ten. For the Overconfidence Index, inspired by Biais et al. (2005), I use a version of the
survey tool introduced in Alpert and Raiffa (1982). Participants are given ten questions
such as: ‘What is the height of the Mt. Everest (in meters)’. They are then instructed
to give both a low and a high estimate, as close as possible to what they believe the
true answer is but such that they are 90% certain that the true answer lies in the stated
interval. To arrive at the index, I then count the number of times that the true answer
did, in fact, lie outside the stated interval and divide this number by the total amount
of questions. For the Gambling Index, participants can state four levels of intensity of
gambling activity in their weekly routines. I code these four levels in ascending intensity
40
with 0, 0.33, 0.66 and 1. Both Stock Experience Basic and Stock Experience Advanced
are dummy variables aimed at eliciting the level of participants’ experience in trading
stocks, based on simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions. For the Irregular BMI variable, I first
use stated height and weight in order to calculate the Body Mass Index according to
the standard formula Weight(kg)
Height(m)2
. I then compare this number to the standardised bench-
marks 18.5 and 25 to check whether a person classifies as underweight or overweight,
respectively. Wealth states the self-reported sum of the value of all assets owned by the
participant.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Trading Outcomes
Net Returns -0.24 10.32 -79.97 171.78
Gross Returns 1.42 10.05 -79.97 176.78
Trading 0.33 0.47 0 1
Exp. Payment 6.9 2.18 6 20
Panel B: Individual Characteristics
Male 0.40 0.49 0 1
Age 24.77 7.54 17 69
Riskseek. Index 0.50 0.17 0 1
Overconf. Index 0.72 0.16 0.1 1
Gambling Index 0.17 0.26 0 1
Stock Exper. Basic 0.20 0.40 0 1
Stock Exper. Adv. 0.13 0.34 0 1
Low Self Est. Index 0.63 0.17 0.06 1
Irregular BMI 0.26 0.44 0 1
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics within the sample for some key variables.
‘Trading Outcomes’ are noted at the decision-level (30 per participant), while ‘Individual
Characteristics’ are stated at the participant-level.
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Table 2.2: Randomisation Check, Part 1: Means by
Randomisation Groups
Top Left Top Right Bottom Left Bottom Right
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.44
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Age 24.25 25.44 24.84 24.55
(5.09) (9.86) (7.07) (7.44)
RiskSeek. Index 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.50
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
Gambling Index 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.18
(0.28) (0.22) (0.28) (0.26)
Overconf. Index 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73
(0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17)
Stock Exper. Basic 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.16
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.37)
Stock Exper. Adv. 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.09
(0.37) (0.33) (0.35) (0.29)
Low Self Est. Index 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.62
(0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Irregular BMI 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.30
(0.44) (0.43) (0.41) (0.46)
Notes: This table provides the means (with standard deviations in parentheses) of some
key personal characteristics for each of the experiment’s four randomisation groups (see
Figure 2.2).
I use information regarding the participants’ personal characteristics to check whether
there are significant differences between the samples of the randomisation groups (the
four quadrants in Figure 2.2). This verifies the succes of the experiment’s randomisation.
Table 2.2 displays the means and standard deviations of some personal characteristics
for the four subsamples. Based on these, Table 2.3 checks for significant differences
across all combinations of the subgroups. I find that out of 60 comparisons, only two
are significant at the 10% level, which is consistent with chance.
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Table 2.3: Randomisation Check, Part 2: Differences across
Randomisation Groups
Col. 1-2 Col. 1-3 Col. 1-4 Col. 2-3 Col. 2-4 Col. 3-4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male 0.033 0.056 -0.008 0.022 -0.042 -0.064
(0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.074)
Age -1.191 -0.584 -0.294 0.606 0.896 0.289
(1.176) (0.924) (0.963) (1.286) (1.329) (1.100)
Riskseek. Index -0.029 -0.041 -0.023 -0.012 0.005 0.017
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Gambling Index 0.074* 0.014 0.006 -0.059 -0.068* -0.008
(0.038) (0.042) (0.042) (0.038) (0.037) (0.042)
Overconf. Index -0.034 -0.038 -0.035 -0.003 -0.000 0.002
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024)
Stock Exper. Basic -0.011 -0.011 0.048 0 0.060 0.060
(0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060)
Stock Exper. Adv. 0.044 0.022 0.074 -0.022 0.029 0.051
(0.053) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.047) (0.049)
Low Self Est. Index 0.020 0.033 0.031 0.012 0.011 -0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Irregular BMI 0.016 0.051 -0.027 0.034 -0.044 -0.079
(0.067) (0.065) (0.070) (0.034) (0.069) (0.068)
Notes: This table provides a randomisation check for the experiment. It shows the differences between
the means of participant characteristics denoted in Table 2.2 (standard errors in parantheses). Alterna-
tive hypothesis is the two-sided inequality. Statistical significance denoted by: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.3 Results
In this section I will examine the effectiveness of the experimental treatments in curbing
excessive trading. I begin by introducing the analysis model and and overall results
and then discuss them with respect to the experiment’s treatments. The most granular
data, meaning trading choice per participant per period, will represent a unit of observa-
tion. Letting i index participants, j sessions and t experimental periods, the regression
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equation can thus be written as follows:
TRADINGijt =β0 + β1 · FEEDBACKij + β2 · FILTERij
+ β3 · INTERACTij + φj + τt + εijt (2.1)
where TRADINGijt denotes a participant’s choice for a given period, coded 0 if the
participant decided to hold and 1 if the participant decided to trade. FEEDBACKij
and FILTERij are dummy variables for the respective experimental treatments and
INTERACTij is a dummy variable capturing potential interaction effects for partic-
ipants who receive both experimental treatments. φj and τt are dummy vectors con-
trolling for potential session- and round-fixed effects which will be added and omitted
from the analysis for robustness. The error term is εijt. Table 2.4 displays the respec-
tive regression coefficients from a pooled OLS-regression with robust standard errors. I
run an identical regression with a net returns, measuring a participant’s gross returns
in a given from holding stocks minus any potential commission fees, as the dependant
variable. Table 2.5 displays the results.
Table 2.4: Effect of Experimental Treatments on Trading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trading Trading Trading Trading
FEEDBACK -0.0554∗∗∗ -0.0550∗∗∗ -0.0554∗∗∗ -0.0550∗∗∗
(-4.20) (-4.16) (-4.21) (-4.16)
FILTER -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0717∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0717∗∗∗
(-5.60) (-5.47) (-5.60) (-5.47)
INTERACT 0.00438 0.00470 0.00438 0.00470




N 10560 10560 10560 10560
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of the experimental treat-
ments on the participant’s trading choices. t statistics in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Treatment Effects on Net Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Returns Net Returns Net Returns Net Returns
FEEDBACK 0.448∗ 0.432∗ 0.447∗ 0.432∗
(1.92) (1.84) (1.92) (1.84)
FILTER 0.357 0.338 0.357 0.337
(1.55) (1.34) (1.55) (1.46)
INTERACT -0.232 -0.205 -0.230 -0.204




N 10350 10350 10350 10350
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of the experimental treatments on net
returns. Outliers beyond the 1st- and 99th-percentile in the net return-distribution have
been dropped. t statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
2.3.1 Detailed Feedback Treatment
As can be seen in Table 2.4, the Feedback Treatment leads to a highly significant re-
duction in the trading behaviour of the participants. Compared to the Control Group,
participants whose propensity to generate experience from their past actions are bol-
stered by the treatment are about 13% less likely to trade, but instead adopt a more
passive strategy of holding their allocated stocks. Moreover, Table 2.5 shows that these
changes in behaviour lead to the expected changes in the participants’ payoff-relevant
metric. The treatment increases monthly net returns by a sizeable 0.45 percentage
points, significant at the 10%-level.
This set of findings corroborates the explanation proposed by Seru et al. (2009) for
the excessive trading puzzle in two accounts. First, my results confirm that a higher
level of experience leads to increases in the trading performance of individual investors.
Second, my results confirm the type of learning responsible for these gains. Rather
than increasing the participants’ capabilities of spotting advantageous opportunities, the
richer availability of performance feedback allows traders to discover their own ineptitude
of doing so. Inflated misconceptions on the own ability of generating profits from active
trading may thus be discovered and addressed by an increased access to information.
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These results overall may thus reflect a rational learning process, rendering excessive
trading as the outgrowth of uncertainty of the traders regarding themselves.
2.3.2 Information Filter Treatment
Table 2.4 shows that reducing access to information regarding the allocated stock’s per-
formance history in the Information Filter Treatment leads to significant reductions of
excessive trading. Participants who do not possess this information to estimate the like-
lihood of the stock generating bad performances in the upcoming period predominantly
hold the stock instead of trying to trade out of their losses. Compared to the Control
Group this accounts for a decrease of 17% of trading activity.
If participants do not have any information to project the performance of their al-
located stock, refraining from trading and thus avoiding the commission fee is, in fact,
unconditionally the correct choice. This behaviour is therefore consistent with a rational
trader attempting to maximise monetary payoffs. If trading activity in the presence of
information was, however, motivated by calculated speculative trading, reducing access
to information should not lead to an average increase in payoffs. Table 2.5 shows that, in
direction, the Information Filter Treatment indeed does lead to a large increase in pay-
offs, although this effect misses out on significance at the 10%-level due to high volatility
in the dependant variable. A stronger picture crystallises, if focus is restricted on rounds
where the historic price information has been indeed suppressed. In Table 2.6, INFO
RESTRICTION is a dummy variable switching on for any period in which participants
did not receive such information. As can be seen, Net Returns in such periods is then
about 0.30 percentage points higher compared to all other rounds, marking a significant
increase at the 10%-level.
These findings are thus consistent with excessive trading being the result of mistakes
in decision-making. Distorted perceptions of perceived information, caused for example
by overconfidence in the precision of one’s own ability to infer valuable signals from
acquired information, can lead to overreactions to such information and, thus, overtrad-
ing. If such overreactions are sufficiently prevalent, reducing access to information may
improve the average quality of trading decisions rather then decreasing it.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Information Restriction on Net Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Returns Net Returns Net Returns Net Returns
INFO RESTRICTION 0.302∗ 0.291∗ 0.304∗ 0.293∗




N 10320 10320 10320 10320
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of information restriction on net returns. The
independent variable is a dummy, switching on if information on the historic returns (subject to
the algorithm in the information filter treatment) has indeed been restricted. Unit of observation is
the decision. Outliers beyond the 1st- and 99th-percentile in the net return-distribution have been
dropped. t statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
2.3.3 Interaction Treatment
Due to the 2× 2 experimental design (see Figure 2.2), a segment of the participant pool
receives both the Detailed Feedback and the Information Filter Treatment, named the
Interaction Treatment. For this group, analytically both the effect of the first treatment,
the second treatment as well as potential interaction effects between the two treatments
are considered in determining behaviour and outcomes. Using the terminology of Equa-
tion (2.1), the total effect is represented by β1 + β2 + β3.
Table 2.4 reveals that the effects of the individual treatments stack nearly seamlessly
in effectiveness for curbing excessive trading in the group. Both the regression coefficient
capturing possible interaction effects as well as the respective t-statistic are very close to
0. The evidence therefore neither suggests that the effects of the individual treatments
reinforce each other nor that they oppose each other. Instead, both lack of knowledge
regarding one’s own capability as well as mistakes in incorporating new information into
decision-making appear to be independent channels in driving excessive trading. Conse-
quently, participants receive the full benefits of both exogenously increased experience
as well as concealment of potentially harmful information, leading to dramatic changes
in behaviour.
These changes are generally reflected in the group’s net returns, too. Table 2.5
shows that there are some negative interaction effects between the experiment’s two
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individual treatments, but these are statistically highly insignificant. In any case, this
interaction effect is lower than any of the two individual treatment effects, so that the
group receiving both treatment earns the highest net returns on average (difference of
the combined effect to the control group significant at the 5%-level with p-value 0.0174).
It should be stressed that, apart from their significance, these effects are large. For
comparison, the mean net returns for participants receiving none of the treatments,
excluding outliers beyond the 1st- and 99th-percentile, lay at −0.69%, while the group
receiving both treatments enjoys a 0.56 percentage point increase in net returns. Both
interventions together are thus able to reverse more than 80% of the losses incurred from
overtrading.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Overconfidence and Gambling
Although the phenomenon of overtrading amongst private individuals, i.e. high trad-
ing volumes leading to subpar net returns, is empirically well-established, its causes are
subject to debate. A strand of literature contends that the observed behaviour is the
result of overstatement of one’s own ability to infer information from any given data,
thus leading to overprecise beliefs. This hypothesis dates back at least to Bondt and
Thaler (1985), who show that actors in the stock market overreact to price movements.
Biais et al. (2005) support this view with experimental evidence, showing that overtrad-
ing is linked to a particular of a psychological disposition towards overreacting dubbed
‘overconfidence’: when predicting future events, people do not sufficiently account for
randomness and overweigh their private information.
While Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) verify this result with real-life data, they
propose a second, independent driver for overtrading. The authors find that trading
activity correlates at the individual level with the amount of speeding tickets received.
As an explanation, they argue that both overtrading and speeding may be the result of
sensation seeking. Stock trading, in this case, assmumes the role of a thrilling gambling
activity. Gao and Lin (2014) further corroborate this hypothesis with findings from
natural experiments, showing that individuals partially substitute stock trading with
playing the lottery. In this case, people may ‘consume’ overtrading, trading off its
leisure value with pecuniary drawbacks.
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Table 2.7: Effects of Personal Characteristics on Trading
Choices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trading Trading Trading Trading
Male -0.0201∗∗ -0.0245∗∗ -0.0201∗∗ -0.0245∗∗
(-2.01) (-2.40) (-2.01) (-2.40)
Age 0.00163∗∗ 0.00197∗∗∗ 0.00163∗∗ 0.00197∗∗∗
(2.28) (2.62) (2.28) (2.62)
Riskseek. Index -0.0268 -0.0285 -0.0268 -0.0285
(-0.99) (-1.02) (-0.99) (-1.02)
Gambling Index 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗
(3.21) (3.32) (3.20) (3.32)
Stock Exper. Basic -0.0275 -0.0255 -0.0275 -0.0255
(-1.63) (-1.48) (-1.63) (-1.48)
Stock Exper. Adv. -0.00830 -0.00549 -0.00830 -0.00549
(-0.43) (-0.28) (-0.43) (-0.28)
Low Self Est. Index 0.00693 0.0230 0.00693 0.0230
(0.25) (0.80) (0.25) (0.81)
Overconf. Index 0.102∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(3.61) (3.41) (3.62) (3.42)
Irregular BMI 0.0142 0.0120 0.0142 0.0120
(1.30) (1.08) (1.30) (1.08)
Wealth -5.43e-08∗ -4.53e-08 -5.43e-08∗ -4.53e-08




Observations 10200 10200 10200 10200
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of participants’ personal charac-
teristics on their trading choices. t statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance is
denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In this section, I use information from the experiment’s follow-up questionnaire to
contribute to this discussion. Table 2.7 depicts the extent to which personal charac-
teristics determines the participants’ trading behaviour (see Section 2.2.2 for a detailed
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description of the construction of all variables). The results support both strands of lit-
erature. In all specifications, an individual’s gambling frequency and overconfidence are
both the most consistent (significant at the 1%-level) as well as the strongest (evaluated
at a change of 1 standard deviation in the all characteristics) predictors of overtrading.
The results, however, contrast with findings from Barber and Odean (2001). Several
studies show gender-differences in different domains of economic decision-making (see
Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a review). Leaning on such evidence, Barber and Odean
(2001) adopt a trader’s gender as a proxy for the tendency to act overconfidently. They
then show that men more than women tend to trade excessively. My results, on the other
hand, do not show any systematic differences between men and women with respect to
overconfidence (p-value for two-sided t-test is 0.42). Indeed, as seen in Table 2.7, male
participants trade less than female ones.
A number of other studies have found divergent results regarding gender-differences
in financial domains, suggesting a more complex underlying mechanism than a binary
gender distinction. Although Deaves et al. (2008) find that in an experimental setting
overconfidence increases trading activity, they neither find gender-differences in overcon-
fidence and only limited support that males trade more often than females. Chen and
Cheng (2018) find, using transactional data from the Taiwanese futures market, that men
trade more often than women but also lose less in doing so, thus disputing an underlying
difference in overconfidence as the driver. They further argue that gender differences in
economic preferences may be driven by the contemporary level of gender-equality. In
particular, a ‘lack’ of overconfidence may be driven by a lack of inequality. Evidence
from Cho (2017) on math-tests across different countries support this hypothesis.
It should be mentioned, though, that of the discussed personal characteristics only
gambling activity translates to a statistically significant effect on trading profits (see
Table 2.8).
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Table 2.8: Effects of Personal Characteristics on Net Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Returns Net Returns Net Returns Net Returns
Male 0.0852 0.0902 0.0878 0.0929
(0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.51)
Age -0.00682 -0.00922 -0.00681 -0.00917
(-0.57) (-0.71) (-0.57) (-0.71)
Riskseek. Index 0.721 0.871∗ 0.723 0.873∗
(1.47) (1.72) (1.48) (1.73)
Gambling Index -0.561∗ -0.588∗ -0.562∗ -0.589∗
(-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.78)
Stock Exper. Basic 0.116 0.0852 0.119 0.0878
(0.38) (0.27) (0.39) (0.28)
Stock Exper. Adv. 0.367 0.308 0.361 0.301
(1.07) (0.88) (1.05) (0.86)
Low Self Est. Index -0.258 -0.281 -0.254 -0.277
(-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.51) (-0.54)
Overconf. Index 0.123 0.120 0.115 0.112
(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
Irregular BMI -0.296 -0.260 -0.293 -0.256




N 9992 9992 9992 9992
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of participants’ personal characteristics on
their net returns. Outliers beyond the 1st- and 99th-percentile in the net return-distribution have
been dropped. t statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
2.4.2 Robustness Towards Risk as a Channel
This article support the argument that information management can curb excessive
trading in a non-interactive stock trading task as well as increasing the profits gained
from it. These results could, however, simply be generated by a shift in the participants’
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risk adjustments. For example, traders could have a desire to hold low-risk portfolios
and be willing to give up some expected returns in order to meet this goal. Therefore,
if they observe that their allocated stock’s returns have been highly volatile over the
past months, they may rationally wish to swap this stock for an (expectedly) lower-risk,
lower-payoff one. In turn, restricting access to such information would then implicitly
foster risk-taking, decrease trading activity and increase expected returns.
Indeed, Gneezy and Potters (1997) find in a lab experimental setting that risk-
taking and trading profits increase if feedback on performance information is supplied
less frequently, while Larson et al. (2016) find in a natural experiment that informing
traders less frequently on prices leads to the same qualitative behaviour. An unsuccesful
replication by Beshears et al. (2016), on the other hand, calls this effect into question.
Risk considerations, however, do not appear to drive this paper’s findings. In Ta-
ble 2.9, Net Return Std. measures the volatility of participants’ period-by-period net
returns through their standard deviation (column (2) displays the same for gross returns).
If the decreased trading volume and increased returns in the experimental treatments
were a result of increased willingness to hold risky stocks, one would expect greater
volatility in the associated payoff stream. However, for both specifications, allocation
to any treatment group actually, if anything, lowers payoff stream volatility. Thus, in
terms of a risk-reward trade-off, the trading performance assisted by the experiment’s
proposed information management dominates the alternative.
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Table 2.9: Effects of Experimental Treatments on Portfolio
Risk
(1) (2)










Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of the experimental
treatments on portfolio risk. Unit of observation is the participant. Inde-
pendent variables denote the standard deviation of the participants’ re-
turns earned throughout all periods; in col. (1) potential commission fees
are deducted, in col. (2) not. Treatment variables are dummies, switch-
ing on if a participant belongs to the respective treatment. t statistics
in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Also, there is no evidence that participants attempt to trade out of risky stock
allocations. In Table 2.10, the variable Hist Ret. Std. captures the volatility of the
historical return of the participant’s allocated stock. Naturally, the sample is restricted
to periods where this information was not suppressed by the FILTER treatment and
participants could indeed observe the stock’s return history. Again, it can be seen that
in both specifications higher observed volatility rather leads to less trading activity than
more, although the effect size is very small. I therefore argue that the benefits from the
experiment’s information interventions arise from novel channels which are independent
from those put forward by Gneezy and Potters (1997).
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Table 2.10: Effect of Allocated Stock Risk on Trading Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trading Trading Trading Trading
Hist. Ret. Std. -0.000244∗ -0.000234∗ -0.000227 -0.000216




N 6346 6346 6346 6346
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of historic risk on trading
activity. Unit of observation is the decision. ”Hist. Ret. Std.” denotes the
standard deviation of the historic returns of the allocated stock. The sample
is restricted to decisions in which the participant could see this information. t
statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
2.5 Conclusion
Excessive trading is a robust real-life phenomenon leading to economically large losses.
In this paper, I present experimental evidence on functional counter-strategies. Both
proposed measures lead to sizeable reductions in trading activity as well as increases in
trading profits. Moreover, as the interventions are purely informational, these findings
reveal new insights into the value of information in non-interactive stock trading by
private individuals. Although I find evidence that providing performance feedback in-
creases trading profits, perhaps even more surprising is that also restricting information
on noisy predictors reduces trading activity.
The analysis further suggests that the results are not generated through increased
risk-taking, a channel proposed in a similar setting by Gneezy and Potters (1997). Over-
all, the results may be seen as a synthesis of Seru et al. (2009)’s and Odean (1998b)’s
hypotheses on the causes of excessive trading. The experiment’s two individual treat-
ments support both hypotheses. Combining both treatments reveals no interdependen-
cies between them, but the effects are rather consistent with both hypotheses acting as
independent channels contributing to the phenomenon.
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Appendix C
Materials from the Experiment
Figure C.1: First instructions screen, common for all participants.
Figure C.2: Second instructions screen, common for all participants.
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Figure C.3: Third instructions screen for Control Group.
Figure C.4: Third instructions screen for Detailed Feedback Treat-
ment.
Figure C.5: Third instructions screen for Information Filter Treat-
ment.
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Figure C.6: Third instructions screen for Treatment Interaction
Group.
Figure C.7: Exemplary information of allotted stock’s performance
history in baseline group.
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Figure C.8: Exemplary screen display for the Detailed Feedback Treat-
ment.
Figure C.9: Exemplary screen display for the Information Filter Treat-
ment when information is restricted.
58
Figure C.10: Follow-up questionnaire, first screen display
Figure C.11: Follow-up questionnaire, second screen display
59
Figure C.12: Follow-up questionnaire, eliciting risk aversion
Figure C.13: Follow-up questionnaire, eliciting measure for overconfi-
dence
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D.1 Generating Data Bundles for the Experiment




import matp lo t l i b . pyplot as p l t
import matp lo t l i b . patches as mpatches









#Def in ing paths and f i l e n a m e s
d i r = r ”C:\ Users \Moritz Mosenhauer\Academia Zeugs\PhD\Research\
WhatIDontKnow\Data\Preparator2 ”
d i r i n p u t = d i r + ’ \ Input ’
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d i r output = d i r + ’ \Output ’
Inputs = ’ CleanedReturnsMonthly . txt ’
ResultName = ”DataN” + s t r ( NumberofPlayers ) + ”T” + s t r (
NumberofPeriods ) + ”Monthly . txt ”
#Reading in Stock Data
os . chd i r ( d i r i n p u t )
RawInputs = i o . open ( Inputs , ’ r ’ , encoding=’ utf−8 ’ ) . read ( ) .
s p l i t l i n e s ( )
RawInputs . pop (0 )
TotalInputLength = len ( RawInputs )
os . chd i r ( d i r output )
with open ( ResultName , ’w ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”” )
#Looping through s t o c k s
f o r RawInput in RawInputs :
ReturnsLis t = RawInput . s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
ReturnsLis t = ReturnsLi s t [ : −1 ]
#Excluding s t o c k s wi th l e s s than 11 e n t r i e s
i f l en ( ReturnsLis t ) < 11 :
p r i n t ( ”LIST IS TOO SHORT, WE HAVE A PROBLEM! ! ! ” )
#Determining t o t a l number o f p o t e n t i a l s t a r t i n g p e r i o d s f o r
hold−
#and trade−s t o c k s
e l s e :
ItemCounter = i n t ( ItemCounter ) + len ( ReturnsLis t ) − 10
AltItemCounter = i n t ( AltItemCounter ) + len ( ReturnsLis t )
#Generate Databundle f o r each p l a y e r and each per iod
f o r i in range ( NumberofDatasets ) :
P l o t L i s t = [ ]
PlayerCounter = i n t ( PlayerCounter ) + 1
#Randomly p i c k i n g hold−s t o c k s e r i e s o f r e t u r n s
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StockIndex = random . rand int ( 1 , ( ItemCounter ) )
#Randomly p i c k i n g trade−s t o c k s e r i e s
AltStockIndex = random . rand int ( 1 , ( AltItemCounter ) )
f o r RawInput in RawInputs :
#Finding the r e l e v a n t s t o c k in l i s t w. r . t . random p i c k
ReturnsLis t = RawInput . s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
ReturnsLis t = ReturnsLi s t [ : −1 ]
Checker = StockIndex − ( l en ( ReturnsLi s t ) − 10)
i f Checker < 0 :
#Prepare p l o t t i n g
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex−1) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex ) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+1) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+2) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+3) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+4) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+5) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+6) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+7) ] )
P l o t L i s t . append ( ReturnsLis t [ ( StockIndex+8) ] )
f i g = p l t . f i g u r e ( )
ax = f i g . add subplot (111)
#Set axes accord ing to return−range
i f a l l ( abs ( f l o a t ( entry ) )<30 f o r entry in P l o t L i s t
) :
ax . s e t y l i m ( [ −31 ,31 ] )
y t i c k l o c a t = [−30 , −15, 0 , 15 , 30 ]
y t i c k e r s = [ r ”−30%” , r ”−15%” , r ”0%” , r ”15%” , r ”
30%” ]
ax . s e t y t i c k s ( y t i c k l o c a t )
ax . s e t y t i c k l a b e l s ( y t i c k e r s , f o n t s i z e= 18)
e l s e :
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i f a l l ( abs ( f l o a t ( entry ) ) <0.50 f o r entry in
P l o t L i s t ) :
ax . s e t y l i m ( [ −51 ,51 ] )
y t i c k l o c a t = [−50 , −25, 0 , 25 , 50 ]
y t i c k e r s = [ r ”−50%” , r ”−25%” , r ”0%” , r ”25%”
, r ”50%” ]
ax . s e t y t i c k s ( y t i c k l o c a t )
ax . s e t y t i c k l a b e l s ( y t i c k e r s , f o n t s i z e= 18)
e l s e :
ax . s e t y l i m ( [ −151 ,151 ] )
y t i c k l o c a t = [−150 , −75, 0 , 75 , 150 ]
y t i c k e r s = [ r ”−150%” , r ”−75%” , r ”0%” , r ”75%
” , r ”150%” ]
ax . s e t y t i c k s ( y t i c k l o c a t )
ax . s e t y t i c k l a b e l s ( y t i c k e r s , f o n t s i z e= 18)
#Adjust Layout
x t i c k l o c a t = [ 0 , 3 , 6 , 9 ]
x t i c k e r s = [ ”10 months \n p r i o r ” , ”7 months \n
p r i o r ” , ”4 months \n p r i o r ” , r ” l a s t month” ]
ax . s e t x t i c k s ( x t i c k l o c a t )
ax . s e t x t i c k l a b e l s ( x t i c k e r s , f o n t s i z e= 14)
p l t . x t i c k s ( r o t a t i o n =70)
Dashedx = [ 0 , 9 ]
Dashedy = [ 0 , 0 ]
l a b e l = ax . s e t y l a b e l ( ’ Stock Returns ’ , f o n t s i z e =
17 , r o t a t i o n=” h o r i z o n t a l ” )
ax . yax i s . s e t l a b e l c o o r d s (−0.025 , 1 . 015 )
p l t . t i g h t l a y o u t ( )
#Plot and Save Figure
ax . p l o t ( P lotL i s t , c o l o r=’b ’ , l i n ew id th=’ 3 ’ )
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ax . p l o t ( Dashedx , Dashedy , ’ k−− ’ , l i n ew id th=’ 2 ’ )
p l t . s a v e f i g ( ” StockHistN ” + s t r ( PlayerCounter ) + ”T”
+ s t r ( PeriodCounter ) + ” . png” , dpi =150)
#Determine unbroken s e r i e s o f r e c e n t p o s i t i v e or
n e g a t i v e r e t u r n s




f o r entry in RevStockReturns :
i f f l o a t ( entry ) < 0 :
NegCounter = i n t ( NegCounter ) + 1
e l s e :
break
RevStockReturns2 = reve r s ed ( P l o t L i s t )
f o r entry2 in RevStockReturns2 :
i f f l o a t ( entry2 ) >= 0 :
PosCounter = i n t ( PosCounter ) + 1
e l s e :
break
i f PosCounter > NegCounter :
TunnelCounter = PosCounter
e l s e :
TunnelCounter = NegCounter
#Write a l l data i n t o f i l e s
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex−1)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return2 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex ) ] )
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)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return3 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+1)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return4 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+2)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return5 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+3)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return6 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+4)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return7 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+5)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return8 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+6)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return9 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+7)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; Return10 = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+8)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; ReturnHold = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( StockIndex+9)
] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; ReturnSe l l = ” )
break
e l s e :
StockIndex = i n t ( StockIndex ) − ( l en ( ReturnsLi s t ) −
10)
#Find and w r i t e trade−s t o c k re turn w. r . t . to random p i c k
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f o r RawInput in RawInputs :
ReturnsLis t = RawInput . s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
ReturnsLis t = ReturnsLi s t [ : −1 ]
AltChecker = AltStockIndex − l en ( ReturnsLi s t )
i f AltChecker < 0 :
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( ReturnsLi s t [ ( AltStockIndex
−1) ] ) )
break
e l s e :
AltStockIndex = i n t ( AltStockIndex ) − l en (
ReturnsLis t )
#Advancing t e c h n i c a l counters
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( ” ; TunnelStimulus = ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( TunnelCounter ) )
i f PlayerCounter == i n t ( NumberofPlayers ) :
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\n” )
PlayerCounter = 0
PeriodCounter = i n t ( PeriodCounter ) + 1
e l s e :
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )







import numpy as np
#Def in ing he lp−v a r i a b l e s
Sess ionCounter = 0







Tota lPar t i c i pan t s = 0
NBySess ionList = [ ]
Part ic ipantHelpCounter = 0
#Def in ing S t r i n g s − Paths and Core−Tableheaders
d i r = r ”C:\ Users \Moritz Mosenhauer\Academia Zeugs\PhD\Research\
WhatIDontKnow\Data\Sess ionData \ Sess ionDataPreparator ”
d i r i n p u t = d i r + ’ \ Input ’
d i r output = d i r + ’ \Output ’
Inputs = ’ CleanedReturnsMonthly . txt ’
ResultName = ” Col la tedSess ionData . txt ”
CoreTableHeader = ”EntryID\ t S e s s i o n \ tPer iod \ tSub jec t \tGroup\
t P r o f i t \ t T o t a l P r o f i t \ t P a r t i c i p a t e \ tReturn1\ tReturn2\ tReturn3
\ tReturn4\ tReturn5\ tReturn6\ tReturn7\ tReturn8\ tReturn9\
tReturn10\ tReturnHold\ tReturnSe l l \ tz \ t I n t e r P e r s z \





























tTreatInteractDummy\ t Gr o s sP r o f i t \ tNormProfit\ tRootNormProfit
\ tLogNormProfit\ tHistReturnsVar iance \ tHistReturnsStd ”
CoreQuestHeader = ”\ tQuestSubject \ t c l i e n t \ tgender \ tage \ the i gh t \
tweight \ twealth \ tstocksOne \ tstocksTwo\ t speed ing \ tgambling \
t d y s c a l c u l i a \ tr i skOne \ triskTwo\ t r i skThree \ t r i skFour \
t r i s k F i v e \ t r i s k S i x \ t r i s kSeven \ t r i s k E i g h t \ t r i s k N i n e \ t r i skTen \
tconfLowOne\ tconfHighOne\tconfLowTwo\ tconfHighTwo\
tconfLowThree\ tconfHighThree \ tconfLowFour\ tconfHighFour \
tconfLowFive\ tconfHighFive \ tconfLowSix\ tconfHighSix \
tconfLowSeven\ tconfHighSeven \ tconfLowEight\ tconfHighEight \
tconfLowNine\ tconfHighNine \ tconfLowTen\ tconfHighTen\
tSelfEsteemOne\ tSelfEsteemTwo\ tSel fEsteemThree \
tSel fEsteemFour \ tSe l fEsteemFive \ tSe l fEsteemSix \










t In f o r e s t Tr ea tA ge I n t e r \ tTreat Inte rAge Inte r \
tFeedTreatWealthInter \ t In f o r e s tTrea tWea l th In t e r \
tTreat Inte rWea l thInte r \ tFeedTreatStockExpOneInter\
t In fores tTreatStockExpOneInter \ tTreatInterStockExpOneInter \
tFeedTreatStockExpTwoInter\ t InforestTreatStockExpTwoInter \
tTreatInterStockExpTwoInter \ tFeedTreatSpeedingInter \
t I n f o r e s t T r e a t S p e e d i n g I n t e r \ tTrea t In t e rSpeed ing In t e r \
tFeedTreatGamblIndexInter\ t In fores tTreatGambl IndexInter \
tTreatInterGamblIndexInter \ tFeedTrea tDysca l cu l i a In t e r \
t I n f o r e s t T r e a t D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r \ t T r e a t I n t e r D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r \
tFeedTreatRiskSeekIndexInter \
t In f o r e s tTrea tR i skSeek Index In t e r \
tTrea t In te rR i skSeek Index Inte r \ tFeedTreatConfIndexInter \
t In f o r e s tTrea tCon f Index In t e r \ tTreat Inte rCon f IndexInte r \
tFeedTreatConfDummyInter\ tInforestTreatConfDummyInter\
tTreatInterConfDummyInter\ tFeedTreatLowSel fEstIndexInter \
t In f o r e s tTrea tLowSe l fEs t Index In t e r \
tTreat Inte rLowSe l fEs t IndexInte r \tFakeEntryDummy”
#Make f o r Browse through a l l d a t a s e t s to determine number o f
p a r t i c i p a n t s ( t o t a l and per s e s s i o n )
f o r Pre f i l ename in os . l i s t d i r ( d i r i n p u t ) :
PartCompareList = [ ]
os . chd i r ( d i r i n p u t )
i f s t r ( Pre f i l ename ) . endswith ( ’ . x l s ’ ) :
Sess ionCounter = Sess ionCounter + 1
PreRawInputs = i o . open ( Pref i lename , ’ r ’ , encoding=’ utf
−8 ’ ) . read ( ) . s p l i t l i n e s ( )
f o r PreRawInput in PreRawInputs :
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PreDataEntryList = PreRawInput . s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
i f PreDataEntryList [ 3 ] == ” Subject ” :
pass
e l s e :
i f PreDataEntryList [ 2 ] == ” s e s s i o n ” :
PartCompareList . append ( i n t ( PreDataEntryList
[ 3 ] ) )
NBySess ionList . append (max( PartCompareList ) )
Tota lPa r t i c i pan t s = Tota lPa r t i c i pan t s + max(
PartCompareList )
p r i n t ( ”The t o t a l number o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i s ” + s t r (
Tota lPa r t i c i pan t s ) )
#Table−Headers f o r Session −, P a r t i c i p a n t s− and Time−Dummies
Sess ionHeader = ””
f o r Ses s ionIndex in range ( Sess ionCounter ) :
Sess ionHeader = Sess ionHeader + ”\ t S e s s i o n ” + s t r ( (
Ses s ionIndex +1) )
Part i c ipantHeader = ””
f o r Par t i c ipant Index in range ( Tota lPa r t i c i pan t s ) :
Part i c ipantHeader = Part ic ipantHeader + ”\ t P a r t i c i p ” + s t r
( ( Par t i c ipant Index +1) )
PeriodHeader = ””
f o r PeriodHeaderIndex in range (30) :
PeriodHeader = PeriodHeader + ”\ tPer iod ” + s t r ( (
PeriodHeaderIndex+1) )
FinalTableHeader = CoreTableHeader + Sess ionHeader +
PeriodHeader + Part ic ipantHeader + CoreQuestHeader +
ExtraQuestHeader + ”\n”
#Writing Tableheader
os . chd i r ( d i r output )
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with open ( ResultName , ’w ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( FinalTableHeader )
#S t a r t Main−Loop
f o r f i l ename in os . l i s t d i r ( d i r i n p u t ) :
os . chd i r ( d i r i n p u t )
#Open Tables
i f s t r ( f i l ename ) . endswith ( ’ . x l s ’ ) :
S e s s i onT i cke r = Ses s i onT i cke r + 1
#Break i n t o E n t r y l i n e s
pr in t ( f i l ename )
RawInputs = i o . open ( f i l ename , ’ r ’ , encoding=’ utf−8 ’ ) .
read ( ) . s p l i t l i n e s ( )
f o r RawInput in RawInputs :
#Break Lines i n t o Datapoints
DataEntryList = RawInput . s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
#Only t r e a t r e l e v a n t l i n e s in o r i g i n a l t a b l e
i f DataEntryList [ 3 ] == ” Period ” :
pass
e l s e :
i f DataEntryList [ 2 ] == ” s u b j e c t s ” :
H i s t o r i c R e t u r n s L i s t = [ ]
IDCounter = IDCounter + 1
#Creat ing Fixed E f f e c t s Dummies
SessionDummyList = [ ]
f o r i in range ( Sess ionCounter −1) :
SessionDummyList . append ( ”0\ t ” )
SessionDummyList . i n s e r t ( ( Ses s ionTicker −1) ,
”1\ t ” )
SessionDummyEntry = ’ ’ . j o i n (
SessionDummyList )
TimeDummyList = [ ]
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f o r i in range (30−1) :
TimeDummyList . append ( ”0\ t ” )
TimeDummyList . i n s e r t ( ( i n t ( DataEntryList
[ 3 ] ) −1) , ”1\ t ” )
TimeDummyEntry = ’ ’ . j o i n (TimeDummyList )
ParticipantDummyList = [ ]
f o r i in range ( Tota lPar t i c ipant s −1) :
ParticipantDummyList . append ( ”0\ t ” )
ParticipantDummyList . i n s e r t ( (
Part ic ipantHelpCounter + i n t (
DataEntryList [ 4 ] ) −1) , ”1\ t ” )
ParticipantDummyEntry = ’ ’ . j o i n (
ParticipantDummyList )





i f i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 1 :
ControlDummy = 1
i f ( i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 2) or ( i n t (
DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 4) :
FeedbackTreatDummy = 1
i f ( i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 3) or ( i n t (
DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 4) :
InfoRestrTreatDummy = 1
i f i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 4 :
TreatInteractDummy = 1
#P r o f i t Manipulat ions
i f DataEntryList [26]==”0” :
Gros sPro f i t = DataEntryList [ 6 ]
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e l s e :
Gro s sPro f i t = DataEntryList [ 2 0 ]
MinProf i t = −79.9748
MaxProfit = 171.7857
NormProfit = ( f l o a t ( DataEntryList [ 6 ] )−
MinProf i t ) /( MaxProfit−MinProf i t )
RootNormProfit = math . s q r t ( NormProfit )
i f not NormProfit == 0 :
LogNormProfit = math . l og ( NormProfit )
e l s e :
LogNormProfit = ””
f o r i in range (10) :
H i s t o r i c R e t u r n s L i s t . append ( f l o a t (
DataEntryList [ 9 + i ] ) )
HistReturnsVar iance = np . var (
H i s t o r i c R e t u r n s L i s t )
HistReturnsStd = np . std ( H i s t o r i c R e t u r n s L i s t
)
#Creat ing Information−R e s t r i c t i o n Dummy
i f i n t ( DataEntryList [ 2 3 ] ) > i n t (
DataEntryList [ 2 1 ] ) :
InfoRestrDummy = 0
e l s e :
InfoRestrDummy = 1
DataEntryList = DataEntryList [ : −1 ]
DataEntryListChopped = DataEntryList [ 3 : ]
os . chd i r ( d i r output )
#Writing MainData
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( IDCounter ) )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( Se s s i onT i cke r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” . j o i n (
DataEntryList [ 3 : ] ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( InfoRestrDummy ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (ControlDummy) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( FeedbackTreatDummy
) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
InfoRestrTreatDummy ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( TreatInteractDummy
) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( Gros sPro f i t ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( NormProfit ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( RootNormProfit ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( LogNormProfit ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
HistReturnsVar iance ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( HistReturnsStd ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( SessionDummyEntry )
TargetData . wr i t e (TimeDummyEntry)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ParticipantDummyEntry )
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os . chd i r ( d i r i n p u t )
#Loop f o r f i n d i n g r e l e v a n t q u e s t i o n n a i r e−
data f o r each main−entry
f o r que s t f i l ename in os . l i s t d i r ( d i r i n p u t ) :
#Open and s p l i t i n t o data−p o i n t s
i f ( s t r ( que s t f i l ename ) . s t a r t s w i t h ( s t r (
f i l ename [ : 1 1 ] ) ) and s t r (
que s t f i l ename ) . endswith ( ’ . txt ’ ) ) :
QuestInputs = i o . open ( quest f i l ename
, ’ r ’ , encoding=’ utf−8 ’ ) . read ( ) .
s p l i t l i n e s ( )
Part icQuestEntry = QuestInputs [ i n t (
DataEntryList [ 4 ] ) ]
QuestDataEntries = Part icQuestEntry
. s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
#Creat ing two t y p e s o f gender−
dummies





e l s e :












#C a l c u l a t i n g BMI and two
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e dummies
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [4]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [4]==”0” or
QuestDataEntries [5]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [5]==”0” ) :
BMI = 10000∗ i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 5 ] ) / f l o a t (
math . pow( i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 ] ) , 2) )
i f ( 18.5< BMI and 25 > BMI ) :
BMIDummyStrict = ”0”
e l s e :
BMIDummyStrict = ”1”
i f ( 17< BMI and 30 > BMI ) :
BMIDummyExtreme = ”0”
e l s e :
BMIDummyExtreme = ”1”





i f QuestDataEntries [ 7 ] == ” yes ” :
StockExpDummyOne = 1
e l s e :
StockExpDummyOne = 0
i f QuestDataEntries [ 8 ] == ” yes ” :
StockExpDummyTwo = 1




i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ” never ” :
GamblingIndex = 0
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ”1−5
t imes ” :
GamblingIndex = 1/ f l o a t (3 )
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ”6 − 10
t imes ” :
GamblingIndex = 2/ f l o a t (3 )
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ”more
than 10 t imes ” :
GamblingIndex = 1
#D ysca l cu l ia−Dummies
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 1 ] == ” yes ” :
DyscalculiaDummy = 1
e l s e :
DyscalculiaDummy = 0
#Creat ing Risk−Seek ing Index and
Dummy whether
#sta tements are c o n s i s t e n t wi th
r a t i o n a l i t y
RiskSeekIndex = 0
prev iouse l ement = None
ConsistencyHitCounter = 0
RiskConsistDummy = ”1”
f o r element in QuestDataEntries
[ 1 2 : 2 2 ] :
RiskSeekIndex = RiskSeekIndex +
i n t ( element )
i f not prev iouse l ement == None :






prev iouse l ement = element
i f ConsistencyHitCounter > 1 :
RiskConsistDummy = ”0”






i f not ( QuestDataEntries [22]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [23]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 2 2 ] ) <= 56 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 2 3 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [24]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [25]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 2 4 ] ) <= 6853 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 2 5 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [26]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [27]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 2 6 ] ) <= 193 <= i n t (
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QuestDataEntries [ 2 7 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [28]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [29]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 2 8 ] ) <= 24 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 2 9 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [30]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [31]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 3 0 ] ) <= 380000 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 3 1 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [32]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [33]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 3 2 ] ) <= 1756 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 3 3 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [34]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [35]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
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[ 3 4 ] ) <= 6000 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 3 6 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [36]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [37]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 3 6 ] ) <= 3474 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 3 7 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [38]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [39]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 3 8 ] ) <= 9562 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 3 9 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [40]==”−”
or QuestDataEntries [41]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 4 0 ] ) <= 10994 <= i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 1 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter =
ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f ConfProblemDummy == 0 :
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OverconfIndex = ConfHitCounter /
f l o a t (10)
i f OverconfIndex > 0 . 7 :
HighOverconfDummy = 1
e l s e :
HighOverconfDummy = ””
OverconfIndex = ””
#Creat ing Low−S e l f e s t e e m I n d e x
SelfEsteemSumOne = 15 − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 2 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 4 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 5 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 8 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 5 1 ] )
SelfEsteemSumTwo = i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 3 ] ) + i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 6 ] ) + i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 7 ] ) + i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 9 ] ) + i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 5 0 ] )
LowSelfEsteemIndex = (
SelfEsteemSumOne +
SelfEsteemSumTwo ) / f l o a t (30)
### Creat ing Personal /Treatment−










Age = f l o a t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 ] )
FeedTreatAgeInter =
FeedbackTreatDummy∗Age
In f o r e s tTrea tAge In t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗Age
Treat Inte rAgeInter =
TreatInteractDummy∗Age
#Wealth
Wealth = f l o a t ( QuestDataEntries [ 6 ] )
FeedTreatWealthInter =
FeedbackTreatDummy∗Wealth
In fo r e s tTrea tWea l th Inte r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗Wealth
Treat InterWeal thInter =
TreatInteractDummy∗Wealth






















Speeding = f l o a t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 9 ] )
FeedTreatSpeedingInter =
FeedbackTreatDummy∗Speeding
I n f o r e s t T r e a t S p e e d i n g I n t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗Speeding










#D y s c a l c u l i a
FeedTreatDysca l cu l i a Inte r =
FeedbackTreatDummy∗
DyscalculiaDummy
I n f o r e s t T r e a t D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗
DyscalculiaDummy







In fo r e s tTrea tR i skSeek Index In t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗
RiskSeekIndex
Treat Inte rRi skSeekIndexInte r =
TreatInteractDummy∗RiskSeekIndex
#Overconf idence Index




In fo r e s tTrea tCon f Index In t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗
OverconfIndex
Treat Inte rConf IndexInter =
TreatInteractDummy∗
OverconfIndex
e l s e :
FeedTreatConfInter = ””
I n f o r e s tT re a t Co n f I n t e r = ””
Treat Inte rCon f Inte r = ””
#Overconf idence Dummy




















In fo r e s tTrea tLowSe l fEs t Index In t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗
LowSelfEsteemIndex
Treat Inte rLowSe l fEs t IndexInte r =
TreatInteractDummy∗
LowSelfEsteemIndex
#Creat ing Fake−Entry Dummy
FakeEntryDummy = 0
#i f ( s t r ( OverconfIndex ) ==”1.0” and
QuestDataEntries [32]==”0” and
BMI==”−”) :
i f ( ( s t r ( DataEntryList [ 0 ] )==”171012
1723 ” and s t r ( DataEntryList [ 4 ] )
==”10” ) or ( s t r ( DataEntryList
[ 0 ] )==”171115 1730 ” and s t r (
DataEntryList [ 4 ] )==”13” ) or ( s t r
( DataEntryList [ 0 ] )==”171018 1718
” and s t r ( DataEntryList [ 4 ] )==”28
” ) ) :
FakeEntryDummy = 1
#p r i n t (”We got S u b j e c t ” + s t r (
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DataEntryList [ 4 ] ) + ” ! ” )
#Writing e v e r y t h i n g down
os . chd i r ( d i r output )
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( Part icQuestEntry )
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (BinaryGenderDummy)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (MaleDummy) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (FemaleDummy)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (OtherGenderDummy)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (BMI) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (BMIDummyStrict )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (BMIDummyExtreme)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (StockExpDummyOne) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (StockExpDummyTwo) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( GamblingIndex ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( DyscalculiaDummy ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( RiskSeekIndex ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( RiskConsistDummy )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( OverconfIndex ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( HighOverconfDummy )
)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( LowSelfEsteemIndex
) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatMaleDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
InforestTreatMaleDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterMaleDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( FeedTreatAgeInter )
)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tAge In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( Treat Inte rAgeInter
) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatWealthInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In fo r e s tTrea tWea l th Inte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat InterWeal thInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatStockExpOneInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In forestTreatStockExpOneInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterStockExpOneInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatStockExpTwoInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
InforestTreatStockExpTwoInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterStockExpTwoInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatSpeedingInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
I n f o r e s t T r e a t S p e e d i n g I n t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Trea t In t e rSpeed ing In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatGamblIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In forestTreatGamblIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterGamblIndexInter ) )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatDysca l cu l i a Inte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
I n f o r e s t T r e a t D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
T r e a t I n t e r D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatRiskSeekIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tR i skSeek Index In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat Inte rRi skSeekIndexInte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatConfIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tCon f Index In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat Inte rConf IndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatConfDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
InforestTreatConfDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
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TreatInterConfDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatLowSel fEstIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tLowSe l fEs t Index In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat Inte rLowSe l fEs t IndexInte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (FakeEntryDummy) )
#Next Line in Data
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\n” )
Part ic ipantHelpCounter = Part ic ipantHelpCounter +






import numpy as np
#Def in ing he lp−v a r i a b l e s
Sess ionCounter = 0








Tota lPar t i c i pan t s = 0
NBySess ionList = [ ]
Part ic ipantHelpCounter = 0
de f Average ( l s t ) :
r e turn sum( l s t ) / l en ( l s t )
#Def in ing S t r i n g s − Paths and Core−Tableheaders
d i r = r ”C:\ Users \Moritz Mosenhauer\Academia Zeugs\PhD\Research\
WhatIDontKnow\Data\Sess ionData \
Sess ionDataPreparatorAggregated ”
d i r i n p u t = d i r + ’ \ Input ’
d i r output = d i r + ’ \Output ’
Inputs = ’ CleanedReturnsMonthly . txt ’
ResultName = ” Col latedSess ionDataAggregated . txt ”
CoreTableHeader = ”EntryID\ t S e s s i o n \tRandomGroup\tControlDummy\
tFeedbackTreatDummy\ tInfoRestrTreatDummy\ tTreatInteractDummy
\ tAverageNetReturns\ tAverageTrading\ tAverageGrossReturns \
tNetReturnVariance\ tNetReturnStd\ tGrossReturnVariance \
tGrossReturnStd\ tTrad ingQuint i l e \tFakeDummy”
CoreQuestHeader = ”\ tQuestSubject \ t c l i e n t \ tgender \ tage \ the i gh t \
tweight \ twealth \ tstocksOne \ tstocksTwo\ t speed ing \ tgambling \
t d y s c a l c u l i a \ tr i skOne \ triskTwo\ t r i skThree \ t r i skFour \
t r i s k F i v e \ t r i s k S i x \ t r i s kSeven \ t r i s k E i g h t \ t r i s k N i n e \ t r i skTen \
tconfLowOne\ tconfHighOne\tconfLowTwo\ tconfHighTwo\
tconfLowThree\ tconfHighThree \ tconfLowFour\ tconfHighFour \
tconfLowFive\ tconfHighFive \ tconfLowSix\ tconfHighSix \
tconfLowSeven\ tconfHighSeven \ tconfLowEight\ tconfHighEight \
tconfLowNine\ tconfHighNine \ tconfLowTen\ tconfHighTen\
tSelfEsteemOne\ tSelfEsteemTwo\ tSel fEsteemThree \
tSel fEsteemFour \ tSe l fEsteemFive \ tSe l fEsteemSix \










t In f o r e s t Tr ea tA ge I n t e r \ tTreat Inte rAge Inte r \
tFeedTreatWealthInter \ t In f o r e s tTrea tWea l th In t e r \
tTreat Inte rWea l thInte r \ tFeedTreatStockExpOneInter\
t In fores tTreatStockExpOneInter \ tTreatInterStockExpOneInter \
tFeedTreatStockExpTwoInter\ t InforestTreatStockExpTwoInter \
tTreatInterStockExpTwoInter \ tFeedTreatSpeedingInter \
t I n f o r e s t T r e a t S p e e d i n g I n t e r \ tTrea t In t e rSpeed ing In t e r \
tFeedTreatGamblIndexInter\ t In fores tTreatGambl IndexInter \
tTreatInterGamblIndexInter \ tFeedTrea tDysca l cu l i a In t e r \
t I n f o r e s t T r e a t D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r \ t T r e a t I n t e r D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r \
tFeedTreatRiskSeekIndexInter \
t In f o r e s tTrea tR i skSeek Index In t e r \
tTrea t In te rR i skSeek Index Inte r \ tFeedTreatConfIndexInter \
t In f o r e s tTrea tCon f Index In t e r \ tTreat Inte rCon f IndexInte r \
tFeedTreatConfDummyInter\ tInforestTreatConfDummyInter\
tTreatInterConfDummyInter\ tFeedTreatLowSel fEstIndexInter \
t In f o r e s tTrea tLowSe l fEs t Index In t e r \
tTreat Inte rLowSe l fEs t IndexInte r \tFakeEntryDummy”
#Browse through a l l d a t a s e t s to determine number o f
p a r t i c i p a n t s ( t o t a l and per s e s s i o n )
f o r Pre f i l ename in os . l i s t d i r ( d i r i n p u t ) :
PartCompareList = [ ]
os . chd i r ( d i r i n p u t )
i f s t r ( Pre f i l ename ) . endswith ( ’ . x l s ’ ) :
Sess ionCounter = Sess ionCounter + 1
PreRawInputs = i o . open ( Pref i lename , ’ r ’ , encoding=’ utf
−8 ’ ) . read ( ) . s p l i t l i n e s ( )
f o r PreRawInput in PreRawInputs :
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PreDataEntryList = PreRawInput . s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
i f PreDataEntryList [ 3 ] == ” Subject ” :
pass
e l s e :
i f PreDataEntryList [ 2 ] == ” s e s s i o n ” :
PartCompareList . append ( i n t ( PreDataEntryList
[ 3 ] ) )
NBySess ionList . append (max( PartCompareList ) )
Tota lPa r t i c i pan t s = Tota lPa r t i c i pan t s + max(
PartCompareList )
p r i n t ( ”The t o t a l number o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i s ” + s t r (
Tota lPa r t i c i pan t s ) )
#Table−Headers f o r Session −, P a r t i c i p a n t s− and Time−Dummies
Sess ionHeader = ””
f o r Ses s ionIndex in range ( Sess ionCounter ) :
Sess ionHeader = Sess ionHeader + ”\ t S e s s i o n ” + s t r ( (
Ses s ionIndex +1) )
FinalTableHeader = CoreTableHeader + Sess ionHeader +
CoreQuestHeader + ExtraQuestHeader + ”\n”
#Writing Tableheader
os . chd i r ( d i r output )
with open ( ResultName , ’w ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( FinalTableHeader )
#S t a r t Main−Loop
f o r f i l ename in os . l i s t d i r ( d i r i n p u t ) :
os . chd i r ( d i r i n p u t )
#Open Tables
i f s t r ( f i l ename ) . endswith ( ’ . x l s ’ ) :
S e s s i onT i cke r = Ses s i onT i cke r + 1
#Break i n t o E n t r y l i n e s
95
pr in t ( f i l ename )
RawInputs = i o . open ( f i l ename , ’ r ’ , encoding=’ utf−8 ’ ) .
read ( ) . s p l i t l i n e s ( )
f o r Par t i c i pan t in range ( NBySess ionList [ Ses s ionTicker
−1]) :
#Creat ing Help V a r i a b l e s
P a r t i c i p P r o f i t L i s t = [ ]
Par t i c i pTrad ingL i s t = [ ]
P a r t i c i p G r o s s P r o f i t L i s t = [ ]
FakeDummy = 0
TreatmentHitDummy = 0





Par t i c i pan t = s t r ( i n t ( Pa r t i c i pan t ) + 1)
f o r RawInput in RawInputs :
#Break Lines i n t o Datapoints
DataEntryList = RawInput . s p l i t ( ’ \ t ’ )
#Only t r e a t r e l e v a n t l i n e s in o r i g i n a l t a b l e
i f DataEntryList [ 3 ] == ” Period ” :
pass
e l s e :
i f DataEntryList [ 2 ] == ” s u b j e c t s ” :
i f DataEntryList [ 4 ] == Par t i c i pan t :
P a r t i c i p P r o f i t L i s t . append ( f l o a t (
DataEntryList [ 6 ] ) )
Par t i c i pTrad ingL i s t . append ( f l o a t (
DataEntryList [ 2 6 ] ) )
#P r o f i t Manipulat ions
i f DataEntryList [26]==”0” :
Gros sPro f i t = DataEntryList [ 6 ]
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e l s e :
Gro s sPro f i t = DataEntryList [ 2 0 ]
P a r t i c i p G r o s s P r o f i t L i s t . append (
f l o a t ( Gros sPro f i t ) )
#Determine Treat − Only once per
P a r t i c i p a n t
i f TreatmentHitDummy == 0 :
i f i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 1 :
ControlDummy = 1
i f ( i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 2)
or ( i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] )
== 4) :
FeedbackTreatDummy = 1
i f ( i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 3)
or ( i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] )
== 4) :
InfoRestrTreatDummy = 1
i f i n t ( DataEntryList [ 5 ] ) == 4 :
TreatInteractDummy = 1
#I d e n t i f y i n g Synthe t i c−E n t r i e s
i f DataEntryList [ 0 ] == ”171012
1723 ” and DataEntryList [ 4 ]
== ”10” :
FakeDummy = 1
i f DataEntryList [ 0 ] == ”171115
1730 ” and DataEntryList [ 4 ]
== ”13” :
FakeDummy = 1
i f DataEntryList [ 0 ] == ”171018




RandomGroup = DataEntryList [ 5 ]
TreatmentHitDummy = 1
#Outcome V a r i a b l e s
AveragePro f i t = Average ( P a r t i c i p P r o f i t L i s t )
AverageTrading = Average ( Par t i c ipTrad ingL i s t )
AverageGrossProf i t = Average (
P a r t i c i p G r o s s P r o f i t L i s t )
NetReturnVariance = np . var ( P a r t i c i p P r o f i t L i s t )
NetReturnStd = np . std ( P a r t i c i p P r o f i t L i s t )
GrossReturnVariance = np . var (
P a r t i c i p G r o s s P r o f i t L i s t )
GrossReturnStd = np . std ( P a r t i c i p G r o s s P r o f i t L i s t )
Trad ingQuint i l e = 5
i f AverageTrading < 0 . 5 :
Trad ingQuint i l e = 4
i f AverageTrading < 0 . 366667 :
Trad ingQuint i l e = 3
i f AverageTrading < 0 . 266667 :
Trad ingQuint i l e = 2
i f AverageTrading < 0 . 166667 :
Trad ingQuint i l e = 1
IDCounter = IDCounter + 1
#Creat ing Dummy−Data
SessionDummyList = [ ]
f o r i in range ( Sess ionCounter −1) :
SessionDummyList . append ( ”0\ t ” )
SessionDummyList . i n s e r t ( ( Ses s ionTicker −1) , ”1\ t ” )
SessionDummyEntry = ’ ’ . j o i n ( SessionDummyList )
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os . chd i r ( d i r output )
#Writing MainData
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( IDCounter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( Se s s i onT i cke r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (RandomGroup) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (ControlDummy) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( FeedbackTreatDummy ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( InfoRestrTreatDummy ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( TreatInteractDummy ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( AveragePro f i t ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( AverageTrading ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( AverageGrossProf i t ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( NetReturnVariance ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( NetReturnStd ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( GrossReturnVariance ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( GrossReturnStd ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( Trad ingQuint i l e ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (FakeDummy) )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( SessionDummyEntry )
os . chd i r ( d i r i n p u t )
#Loop f o r f i n d i n g r e l e v a n t q u e s t i o n n a i r e−data f o r
each main−entry
f o r que s t f i l ename in os . l i s t d i r ( d i r i n p u t ) :
#Open and s p l i t i n t o data−p o i n t s
i f ( s t r ( que s t f i l ename ) . s t a r t s w i t h ( s t r ( f i l ename
[ : 1 1 ] ) ) and s t r ( que s t f i l ename ) . endswith ( ’ .
txt ’ ) ) :
QuestInputs = i o . open ( quest f i l ename , ’ r ’ ,
encoding=’ utf−8 ’ ) . read ( ) . s p l i t l i n e s ( )
Part icQuestEntry = QuestInputs [ i n t (
Par t i c i pan t ) ]
QuestDataEntries = ParticQuestEntry . s p l i t ( ’
\ t ’ )
#Creat ing two t y p e s o f gender−dummies





e l s e :











#C a l c u l a t i n g BMI and two i n t e r p r e t a t i v e
dummies
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [4]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [4]==”0” or
QuestDataEntries [5]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [5]==”0” ) :
BMI = 10000∗ i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 5 ] ) /
f l o a t (math . pow( i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 4 ] ) , 2) )
i f ( 18.5< BMI and 25 > BMI ) :
BMIDummyStrict = ”0”
e l s e :
BMIDummyStrict = ”1”
i f ( 17< BMI and 30 > BMI ) :
BMIDummyExtreme = ”0”
e l s e :
BMIDummyExtreme = ”1”





i f QuestDataEntries [ 7 ] == ” yes ” :
StockExpDummyOne = 1
e l s e :
StockExpDummyOne = 0
i f QuestDataEntries [ 8 ] == ” yes ” :
StockExpDummyTwo = 1
e l s e :
StockExpDummyTwo = 0
#Gambling Dummies
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ” never ” :
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GamblingIndex = 0
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ”1−5 t imes ” :
GamblingIndex = 1/ f l o a t (3 )
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ”6 − 10 t imes ” :
GamblingIndex = 2/ f l o a t (3 )
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 0 ] == ”more than 10
t imes ” :
GamblingIndex = 1
#D ysca l cu l ia−Dummies
i f QuestDataEntries [ 1 1 ] == ” yes ” :
DyscalculiaDummy = 1
e l s e :
DyscalculiaDummy = 0
#Creat ing Risk−Seek ing Index and Dummy
whether
#sta tements are c o n s i s t e n t wi th r a t i o n a l i t y
RiskSeekIndex = 0
prev iouse l ement = None
ConsistencyHitCounter = 0
RiskConsistDummy = ”1”
f o r element in QuestDataEntries [ 1 2 : 2 2 ] :
RiskSeekIndex = RiskSeekIndex + i n t (
element )
i f not prev iouse l ement == None :
i f not prev iouse l ement == element :
ConsistencyHitCounter =
ConsistencyHitCounter + 1
prev iouse l ement = element
i f ConsistencyHitCounter > 1 :
RiskConsistDummy = ”0”






i f not ( QuestDataEntries [22]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [23]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 2 ] ) <= 56
<= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 3 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [24]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [25]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 4 ] ) <=
6853 <= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 5 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [26]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [27]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 6 ] ) <= 193
<= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 7 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [28]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [29]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 8 ] ) <= 24
<= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 2 9 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [30]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [31]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 0 ] ) <=
380000 <= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 1 ] ) :
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ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [32]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [33]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 2 ] ) <=
1756 <= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 3 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [34]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [35]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 4 ] ) <=
6000 <= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 6 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [36]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [37]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 6 ] ) <=
3474 <= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 7 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [38]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [39]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 8 ] ) <=
9562 <= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 9 ] ) :
ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f not ( QuestDataEntries [40]==”−” or
QuestDataEntries [41]==”−” ) :
i f not i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 4 0 ] ) <=
10994 <= i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 4 1 ] ) :
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ConfHitCounter = ConfHitCounter + 1
e l s e :
ConfProblemDummy = 1
i f ConfProblemDummy == 0 :
OverconfIndex = ConfHitCounter / f l o a t
(10)
i f OverconfIndex > 0 . 7 :
HighOverconfDummy = 1
e l s e :
HighOverconfDummy = ””
OverconfIndex = ””
#Creat ing Low−S e l f e s t e e m I n d e x
SelfEsteemSumOne = 15 − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 2 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 4 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 5 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 8 ] ) − i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 5 1 ] )
SelfEsteemSumTwo = i n t ( QuestDataEntries
[ 4 3 ] ) + i n t ( QuestDataEntries [ 4 6 ] ) + i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 7 ] ) + i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 4 9 ] ) + i n t (
QuestDataEntries [ 5 0 ] )
LowSelfEsteemIndex = ( SelfEsteemSumOne +
SelfEsteemSumTwo ) / f l o a t (30)
### Creat ing Personal /Treatment−










Age = f l o a t ( QuestDataEntries [ 3 ] )
FeedTreatAgeInter = FeedbackTreatDummy∗Age
In f o r e s tTrea tAge In t e r = InfoRestrTreatDummy
∗Age
Treat Inte rAgeInter = TreatInteractDummy∗Age
#Wealth
Wealth = f l o a t ( QuestDataEntries [ 6 ] )
FeedTreatWealthInter = FeedbackTreatDummy∗
Wealth
In fo r e s tTrea tWea l th Inte r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗Wealth
Treat InterWeal thInter = TreatInteractDummy∗
Wealth
















Speeding = f l o a t ( QuestDataEntries [ 9 ] )
FeedTreatSpeedingInter = FeedbackTreatDummy
∗Speeding
I n f o r e s t T r e a t S p e e d i n g I n t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗Speeding









#D y s c a l c u l i a
FeedTreatDysca l cu l i a Inte r =
FeedbackTreatDummy∗DyscalculiaDummy
I n f o r e s t T r e a t D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗DyscalculiaDummy





In fo r e s tTrea tR i skSeek Index In t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗RiskSeekIndex




i f not OverconfIndex == ”” :
FeedTreatConfIndexInter =
FeedbackTreatDummy∗OverconfIndex
In fo r e s tTrea tCon f Index In t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗OverconfIndex
Treat Inte rConf IndexInter =
TreatInteractDummy∗OverconfIndex
e l s e :
FeedTreatConfInter = ””
I n f o r e s tT re a t Co n f I n t e r = ””
Treat Inte rCon f Inte r = ””
#Overconf idence Dummy















In fo r e s tTrea tLowSe l fEs t Index In t e r =
InfoRestrTreatDummy∗LowSelfEsteemIndex
Treat Inte rLowSe l fEs t IndexInte r =
TreatInteractDummy∗LowSelfEsteemIndex
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#Creat ing Dummy to i d e n t i f y s y n t h e t i c
e n t r i e s
FakeEntryDummy = 0
#i f ( s t r ( OverconfIndex ) ==”1.0” and
QuestDataEntries [32]==”0” and BMI==”−”) :
i f ( ( s t r ( DataEntryList [ 0 ] )==”171012 1723 ”
and s t r ( DataEntryList [ 4 ] )==”10” ) or ( s t r
( DataEntryList [ 0 ] )==”171115 1730 ” and
s t r ( DataEntryList [ 4 ] )==”13” ) or ( s t r (
DataEntryList [ 0 ] )==”171018 1718 ” and s t r
( DataEntryList [ 4 ] )==”28” ) ) :
FakeEntryDummy = 1
#Writing e v e r y t h i n g down
os . chd i r ( d i r output )
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( Part icQuestEntry )
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (BinaryGenderDummy)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (MaleDummy) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (FemaleDummy)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (OtherGenderDummy)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (BMI) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (BMIDummyStrict )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e (BMIDummyExtreme)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (StockExpDummyOne) )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (StockExpDummyTwo) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( GamblingIndex ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( DyscalculiaDummy ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( RiskSeekIndex ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( RiskConsistDummy )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( OverconfIndex ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( HighOverconfDummy )
)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( LowSelfEsteemIndex
) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatMaleDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
InforestTreatMaleDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterMaleDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( FeedTreatAgeInter )
)
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tAge In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r ( Treat Inte rAgeInter
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) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatWealthInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In fo r e s tTrea tWea l th Inte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat InterWeal thInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatStockExpOneInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In forestTreatStockExpOneInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterStockExpOneInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatStockExpTwoInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
InforestTreatStockExpTwoInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterStockExpTwoInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatSpeedingInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
I n f o r e s t T r e a t S p e e d i n g I n t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Trea t In t e rSpeed ing In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatGamblIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In forestTreatGamblIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterGamblIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatDysca l cu l i a Inte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
I n f o r e s t T r e a t D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
T r e a t I n t e r D y s c a l c u l i a I n t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatRiskSeekIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tR i skSeek Index In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat Inte rRi skSeekIndexInte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatConfIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tCon f Index In t e r ) )
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TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat Inte rConf IndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatConfDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
InforestTreatConfDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
TreatInterConfDummyInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
FeedTreatLowSel fEstIndexInter ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
In f o r e s tTrea tLowSe l fEs t Index In t e r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (
Treat Inte rLowSe l fEs t IndexInte r ) )
TargetData . wr i t e ( ”\ t ” )
TargetData . wr i t e ( s t r (FakeEntryDummy) )
#Next Line in Data
with open ( ResultName , ’ a ’ ) as TargetData :





co-authored with Sayantan Ghosal
3.1 Introduction
Taking as its starting point the divergence between private and social valuations of
economic activity, growth diagnostics (Hausmann et al., 2005a, 2008; Rodrik, 2010) is
a strategy for identifying the priorities for policy reform in settings characterized by
second-best distortions (Pigou, 1954; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). As Hausmann et
al. (2005a) put it: ”The idea behind the strategy is simple: if (a) for whatever reason
the full list of requisite reforms is unknowable or impractical, and (b) figuring out the
second-best interactions across markets is a near-impossible task, the best approach is
to focus on the reforms where the direct effects can be reasonably guessed to be large.
... The principle to follow is simple: go for the reforms that alleviate the most binding
constraints, and hence produce the biggest bang for the reform buck.” (p. 7)
A vast policy literature uses growth diagnostics as a policy framework, from the early
work by the World Bank (World Bank, 2005, with a focus on emerging market economies
and eastern European Economies e.g. Cambodia, India, Brazil, the Baltic States) and
the Asian Development Bank (Felipe et al., 2011), to the more recent initiative by the
Scottish Government (Scottish Government, 2016) focusing on inclusive growth and the
related work in New Zealand (Karacaoglu, 2015). The bulk of this literature uses growth
diagnostics as a tool for identifying priorities for policy reform at a given point in time.
However, the empirical literature on policy reform and growth (Hausmann et al.,
2005b) suggests that policy reform is an adaptive process that occurs over a period of
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time; moreover, policy reforms that work in some settings do not necessarily work in
all settings (Rodrik, 2008), conventional wisdom is often wrong (Campos and Coricelli,
2002), the sequencing of policy reform matters and policy-makers may get the sequencing
wrong (Edwards, 1990).
Further, second-best distortions may interact in ways that mean the indirect social
welfare losses of relaxing a second-best constraint swamp the direct social welfare gain
from doing so (see Bergoeing et al., 2015, for an empirical analysis in the context of firm
entry/exit and adoption of new technologies in emerging market economies). Reducing
a distortion in one activity introduces distortions in activities that, before the policy
reform, were otherwise undistorted e.g. mitigating the underprovision of a public good
by a distortionary income tax. If the policy-maker wrongly estimates the benefits and
costs involved, there may be an overall net social welfare loss.
Motivated by the preceding considerations, this paper provides a formal analysis of
the conditions under which an adaptive implementation of growth diagnostics converges
to a socially desirable growth outcome even allowing for the possibility of mistakes i.e.
situations where the losses dominate the gains.
While the policy-maker may have a reasonably accurate estimate of the first-order
approximation (direct effect) of reducing a distortion, information about the second-
order effects of doing so is less reliable. Nevertheless, the policy-maker may have access
to different sources of information (signals generated by an unknown stochastic process)
that produce estimates of potential losses to social welfare from the second-order in-
teraction effects. When these losses outweigh the first-order welfare gains, a mistake
occurs.
We study an adaptive policy process, which, under minimal assumptions on the
nature of uncertainty ensures (Proposition 1) that realized gross social welfare losses
are almost surely (with probability one) bounded. This condition, in turn, implies
convergence to the socially optimal outcome. The adaptive policy process ensures that
the change in the weight assigned to different signals point in the same direction as net
social welfare gains irrespective of the outcome, a property similar to one used in the
proof of Blackwell’s approachability theorem (Blackwell, 1956). Then, Proposition 2
shows that any policy process (and not just the one formally analysed below in section
3.2) which satisfies the condition that losses are almost surely bounded will converge to
the socially optimal outcome.
How economic insights should be translated into governmental legislation is a long-
standing debate. Lindblom (1959, 1979) was an early proponent of incremental experi-
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mentation in policy-making. He argued that any economic analysis comes with a high
degree of uncertainty and must be regarded as incomplete. In a static policy-setting,
he showed that reforms based on these analyses should reflect the underlying incom-
pleteness by implementing changes in small steps and profiting from the information
feedback rather than reaching for swiping ”all-or-nothing” solutions. While Lindblom
(1959, 1979) saw muddling as the best of a number of bad options, scholars have since
gone beyond these claims in examining the role of explicit and purposeful experimen-
tation in policy-making (Hayek, 1978; North, 1990; Roland, 2000; Mukand and Rodrik,
2005). Our theoretical results contribute to this literature by showing how a process of
policy making involving adaptive experimentation can, under minimal assumptions on
the uncertainty involved, converge to the socially optimal outcome. In Section 4, we
discuss a number of different historical examples to illustrate how such a process could
play out in practice.
Our results are related to the convergence properties of iterative processes in public
good and collective consumption by Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971), Malinvaud
(1972) and retrading in market games (Ghosal and Morelli, 2004) where reallocations can
be Pareto improving at each step. However, in contrast to Proposition 2, these papers
do not allow for the possibility of mistakes. Ghosal and Porter (2013) in their analysis
of cautious retrading in the context of exchange economies assume a property related to
the condition that losses are almost surely bounded; however, in contrast to Proposition
1, they do not derive it as an outcome of an explicitly defined adaptive forecasting and
policy implementation process. The formulation the adaptive policy process and the
first part of the proof of Proposition 1 is related to Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2004).
In specific settings, taking into account both the direct and indirect effects of policy
reform that target second-best distortions is particularly important with limited fiscal
resources, a point emphasized by Martin and Pindyck (2015) and in policy discussions by
the New Zealand Government (Karacaoglu, 2015, 2016) and various Scottish Government
papers linked to the use of growth diagnostics (e.g. Gillespie, 2016; Scottish Government,
2016).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out a reduced
form second-best policy framework; section 3 is devoted to stating and deriving the main
results of the paper. Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of relevant historical examples.
The last section concludes.
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3.2 A Reduced-Form Policy Framework
We begin by setting out a reduced form policy framework that takes as the starting point
the role of second-best distortions which introduce a wedge between social and private
marginal valuations of economic activity. For the purpose of illustration, we accompany
the general introduction of the model with a simplified, stylised example.
Let X= {Xi,a,t : i ∈ I, a ∈ A, t ∈ T} denote a trajectory where I denotes a list of
activities, A denotes a list of economic agents and T (where T could be finite or infinite)
denotes a list of time periods. For our stylised example, we will consider an economy
with two economic agents, so that A = {1, 2}. There are two activities those agents may
follow, meaning I = {1, 2}. On the one hand, agents may drive environmentally friendly
cars. Alternatively, agents may, for leisure, drive large and fast cars that are harmful to
the environment. Time, T , is infinite.
Let X ⊂ <IAT denote the set of feasible trajectories. Feasibility, in this context,
would include constraints such as intertemporal budget (resource) and technological
constraints. We allow for the feasible state to depend on the initial state summarizing
the history of the economy. We assume that X is a compact, convex set with a non-empty
interior. 1
Let W : X → R denote a continuous, strictly concave twice continuously (Frechet)
differentiable social welfare function that has a unique maximum (denoted by Y ) in the
interior of X.
Let X 6= Y denote the equilibrium trajectory generated by some underlying pattern
of market/strategic interactions between agents over time. As X 6= Y , it must be the case
that there are distortions which introduce a wedge between social and private marginal
valuations in economic activity. Let ua : X → R denote a continuous, concave, twice
continuously (Frechet) differentiable utility function that represents the preferences of
agent a over the set of feasible trajectories.
Let ua,i,t(X) be the derivative of ua to the i
th and tth element and, analogously, Wi,t
the derivative of W (X) to the ith and tth element. Thus, ua,i,t(X) denotes the marginal
valuation of activity i by agent a at period t.2 It follows that for at least one activity i
and agent a, there exists a constant da,i,t 6= 0 such that
Wi,t(X)− ua,i,t(X)− da,i,t = 0, i ∈ I, a ∈ A, t ∈ T (1)
1Compactness is preserved from Xi,a,t.
2As both ua,i,t(X) and Wi,t are marginal concepts, separability of preferences is not required.
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where along trajectory X, Wi,t(X) denotes the social valuation of activity i at time t,
ua,i,t(X) denotes the corresponding private valuation by agent a and da,i,t 6= 0 for some
i ∈ I, a ∈ A, t ∈ T is the associated distortion.
For the stylised example, we assume that the environmental impact of driving en-
vironmentally friendly cars is small. As an agent carrying out this activity imposes
weak negative effects on other agents, we state that an agent’s private valuation of this
activity differs slightly from the social valuation of it. On the other hand, driving en-
vironmentally harmful cars causes pollution and thereby decreases the welfare of other
agents strongly. Therefore, there exists a strong for potential of the social valuation of
driving environmentally harmful cars to differ from the private valuation. we further
assume that agent 1 has an inherent disposition to act in an environmentally conscious
fashion so that the agent never engages is in driving harmful cars, but instead solely
drives environmentally friendly ones. Agent 2, however, does not have this disposition
and instead engages in driving environmentally harmful cars.
Consider, a second-best social welfare maximization where at a given point in time
t, taking the trajectory X as a starting point, the social planner maximizes W over X
treating (1) as a system of constraints. Let dt = (da,i,t : i ∈ I, a ∈ A). Let W̃ (dt) denote
the value function of the maximization problem viewed as a function of dt. Consider
a vector of perturbations in a small neighbourhood of zero, εt = (εa,i,t : i ∈ I, a ∈ A).
Suppose the policy-maker attempts to alter the second-best distortions dt by εt. Using
a (second-order) Taylor series expansion, we obtain:


















Varying εt can be seen as implementing policy-packages at time t. For the accompa-
nying example, we will consider two single policies aimed at cutting back the socially
detrimental overindulgence in driving cars. First, we consider a tax on gasoline. Second
we consider a toll levied for the usage of public roads.
For each a ∈ A, and i ∈ I and t ∈ T , let µa,i,t denote the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with (1) in the maximization problem where taking the trajectory X as a
starting point, the social planner maximizes W over X treating (1) as a system of
constraints. Clearly µa,i,t can be interpreted as the marginal (incremental) social value
along the trajectory X of reducing the distortion of activity i for agent a at time t. As
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W̃t(dt) is a value function, using duality, it follows that:
∂W̃t (dt)
∂da,i,t
= −µa,i,t for all a, i, t such that da,i,t 6= 0 (3).
The first term in equation (2) captures the direct effect on social welfare, at a given
point of time, when distortion of activity i′ for agent a′ at time t′ is reduced. Using
equation (3), it is clear that when activity i is undistorted so that da,i,t = 0, the social
valuation and private valuation of activity i at time t are identical. Along a specific
trajectory X, the more socially costly is the distortion in activity i for agent a at time
t, the higher is the value of µa,i,t, the current marginal social valuation of reducing the
distortion da,i,t.
The second term in equation (2) captures the indirect effect on social welfare of
reducing the distortion da,i,t via its impact on the marginal social valuation of reducing
the distortion valuation da′,i′,t: when there are other distorted activities, on the margin,
the interaction effects between the different distortions will matter. The sum of the
second-order indirect effects captures the effect of changing the distortion in activity i′
for agent a′ at time t′ on the marginal social value of reducing distortions in all other
activities i for other agents a.
For the considered policies of taxing gasoline and collecting tolls for the usage of
public roads, it may easily be imagined that both policies will individually have a neg-
ative impact on the valuation for driving all kinds of cars for all agents. Moreover, as
all agents privately overvalue all manners of car-driving, we assume that the package of
implementing both policies, via extra costs for all agents carrying out the considered ac-
tivities, would work towards realigning private valuations with social valuations in terms
of the direct effects of both policies. The same holds true for both policies individually.
However, both policies, if implemented simultaneously, may also interact with each
other in changing the agents’ private valuations of the considered activities. In partic-
ular, although implementing tolls for public roads when a tax on gasoline is already in
place leads to an added positive direct effect in aligning private valuations of driving
environmentally-friendly cars, both effects could reinforce each other to the extent that
the private valuation of driving environmentally friendly cars dips below the social val-
uation. While before implementing both policies one would expect overindulgence in
driving environmentally friendly cars, one would expect underindulgence after it, due
to undesirable indirect effects from the policy package. In fact, we assume that such
negative indirect effects outweigh the direct beneficial effects of both individual policies,
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leading to an overall decrease in social welfare when the policy-package is implemented.
In this case, it would be in the social planner’s interest to not implement tolls for public
roads in the presence of a tex of gasoline despite their beneficial direct effects on social
welfare.
3.3 Adaptation, Mistakes and Convergence to Social Op-
timum
Heuristically, growth diagnostics can be viewed as an adaptive strategy for identifying
the priorities for policy reform. In this section, we model growth diagnostics as an
adaptive policy tool i.e. at each point in time, given the prevailing trajectory of the
economy, reduce the second-best distortion or gap with the greatest direct social impact.
However, in attempting to do so, the policy maker may not have enough information to
rule out losses in social welfare from an application of the growth diagnostic. What are
the conditions under which an adaptive application of growth diagnostics results in a
sequence of changes in social welfare that converge to the socially optimal outcome even
allowing for the possibility of mistakes? In this section, we model an adaptive forecasting
and policy implementation process, which under minimal assumptions on the nature of
uncertainty over potential welfare losses, converges to the socially optimal allocation.
Starting from some feasible trajectory X 6= Y , at a given t and the associated vector
of distortions dt, the policy-maker implements dt+εt, where εt = arg maxεt∈N(0) ∆εt (X; dt)
(where N(0) is a small neighbourhood of zero) with the objective of achieving gross so-
cial welfare gains ∆ (X; dt) (upto a second-order approximation). For later reference, we
label this as implementing growth diagnostics at time t.
For the stylised example, we will restrict our attention to a limited number of actions,
or policy-packages, which the social planner can introduce. The social planner can
decide to only tax gasoline, only levy tolls for public roads or implement both measures
simultaneously. While all of these policy-packages can be introduced, they can also
be revoked in any combination. We assume that the ordering of all considered policy-
packages in terms of social welfare is as follows, best to worst: taxing gasoline, levying
tolls on public roads, no policies, taxing gasoline and levying tolls.
Starting at some initial time period t = 0, an adaptive implementation of growth
diagnostics generates a sequence of trajectories
(
X̂(t) : t ≥ 0
)
and an associated se-






: t ≥ 1
)
.
Starting from some trajectory X at time t, let bt ≥ 0 denote the positive effects
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(benefits) on social welfare incurred after implementing dt + εt and let lt ≥ 0 denote the
negative effects (loss) on social welfare welfare incurred after implementing dt + εt. The
net social welfare gains at time t are then bt−lt (upto a second-order approximation). We
say that the policy maker makes a mistake while implementing the growth diagnostics
whenever bt − lt < 0 i.e. there is a net social welfare loss at time t. Framed in the
context of the stylised example, introducing both a tax on gasoline as wells as tolls for
public roads would constitute such a mistake. Negative indirect interaction effects (see
section 3.2 for a further discussion) of the policy-packages swamp any direct benefits of
both individual policies and thus lead to an overall decrease of social welfare.
We assume that lt ≤ L̃, L̃ > 0 at each t where the bound L̃ on the gross social
welfare loss in any one period is uniform over X. Furthermore, assume that there are
s = 1, ..., N sources of signals about the gross social welfare loss. Let ls,t ≤ L̃ denote
expected gross social welfare losses given signal s that could be incurred when growth
diagnostics is implemented at time t. For each signal s = 1, ..., N , the policy-maker
computes the net social welfare b0 − ls,0.
Assume that the policy maker puts a weight fs,0 = 1 on each signal s. Let fs,t denote
the weight on signal s at some t ≥ 0. Given α, 12 ≤ α < 1, if there are at least as many
signals as αN such that b0 − ls,0 ≥ 0 (a net social welfare gain), growth diagnostics
is implemented at t = 0; otherwise, the policy maker does nothing and the economies
continues along X(0) for one more time period.
If a mistake occurs (i.e. there is an actual net social welfare loss) the policy-maker
reduces the weight on all signals s such that b0− ls,0 ≥ 0 by a fixed fraction β, 0 < β < 1.
In any subsequent period t > 0, the policy maker compares the total weight of the
experts predicting a net social welfare gain with those predicting a net social welfare
loss at X(t) and growth diagnostics is implemented only if the total weight on signals
predicting a net social welfare gain exceeds αFt, where Ft is the total weight on signals
in period t; otherwise, the policy maker does nothing and the economy continues along
X(t) for one more time period.
As before, at each t where a mistake occurs the policy-maker reduces the weight on
all signals s such that bt − ls,t ≥ 0 by a fixed fraction β, 0 < β < 1.
We make one assumption about the underlying stochastic processes generating the
signals, the almost surely finite mistakes property: there exists a signal s∗ (the
policy-maker does not know which one) such that, with probability one, along the se-
quence of trajectories {X(t) : t ≥ 0} generated by an adaptive implementation of growth
diagnostics, the corresponding sequence {lt : t ≥ 0} is such that bt − ls∗,t < 0 only for
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finitely many t, t ≥ 0: this number (assumed to be the minimum over all signals which
satisfy the above property) is denoted by m∗.
We make no other assumptions about the underlying stochastic processes generating
the signals, specifically, we do not assume that the policy maker knows that the under-
lying stochastic processes generating the signals has the almost surely finite mistakes
property.
Note that, by construction, the adaptive forecasting and policy making process sat-
isfies the following condition for each t ≥ 0:
∑
s
[∆ (X(t))− lt] [fs,t+1 − fs,t] ≥ 0 (4)
where the weight fs,t for each source s changes according to whether a false prediction
has been made or not. In words, the change in the weight assigned to different signals
point in the same direction as net social welfare gains, irrespective of the outcome. This
condition is similar to a key property used in the proof of Blackwell’s approachability
theorem (Blackwell, 1956).
Let lt ∈ {ls,t : s = 1, ..., N} denote the realised gross social welfare loss incurred at
time t when growth diagnostics is implemented at time t. We say that losses are
almost surely bounded if
∞∑
t=0
lt ≤ L, for some finite L, with probability one.
In order to illustrate how the given learning environment affects the process of policy-
making, we will now lay out a number of representative cases making use of the stylised
example we have introduced so far. Note that in all cases the socially optimal solution
is reached if gasoline is taxed but no tolls for public roads are levied. In all cases, we
will direct special attention to potential obstacles in achieving this outcome and how the
adaptive policy process described can overcome them.
For simplicity, we choose two sources of signals, called ‘experts’, providing informa-
tion to the social planner on projected welfare losses associated with any given policy-
package while α = 0.5. Hence, whenever the social planner assigns the same weight to
both experts, a single recommendation from any of the experts is sufficient for the social
planner to implement a policy-package. On the other hand, discrediting any of the two
experts by deflating the associated weight by any 0 < β < 1 as the result of a false
recommendation will lead to a clear favour towards the other expert.
It should be noted, that the model always allows for the possibility of inaction in
any given given time period so that no policies are implemented or revoked. This occurs
if none of the policy-packages the social planner contemplates gathers a critical level of
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support, i.e. at least one expert projecting a net welfare gain as a result of the change.
This case can be interpreted as experts debating among themselves as well as potential
uncertainty about the future being resolved as time passes. As the more interesting
cases, from a modelling perspective, are time periods where actions are taken, we will
focus on these.
Case 1: no possibility for mistakes
We will first consider a case where the projected welfare losses by the two available
experts are always correct on all policy-packages the social planner considers. For the
chosen setting, the planner needs at least one expert to support (via the stated loss
estimate) any given policy-package in order to implement it. However, if all experts
always provide correct information on all packages, a policy-package leading to a welfare
loss can never garner any support. Therefore, the social planner cannot make mistakes in
this scenario. Moreover, all policy-packages that do, in fact, entail net social welfare gains
will always gather full support and thus will be implemented. For an economy starting
on a sub-optimal trajectory in the given setting, this represents a best-case scenario.
The policy-maker will implement the correct policy-mixture (taxing gasoline but not
levying tolls on roads) while not incurring any welfare losses from policy-mistakes.
Case 2: temporary possibility for mistakes
Next, we will consider the case where one of the experts may provide incorrect
projections on welfare losses of policy-packages to the social planner. In particular, we
assume that one of the experts projects that implementing both a tax on gasoline as well
as levying tolls on public will not lead to any indirect interaction effects between the two
single policies. As the direct effects of both individual policies are set to be positive, the
social planner will be tempted to implement the policy-package. Since also at least one
expert predicts net social welfare gains as a result of this policy, the social planner may
indeed implement it. In the terminology of our model, this constitutes a mistake while
implementing growth diagnostics.
While one of the experts provides incorrect advice, we assume in this scenario that
the other expert always provides correct advice. The expert providing correct advice
thus satisfies the almost surely finite mistakes property with the addition that, in this
particular case, there is no intermediate time span where the expert in question may
provide incorrect information.
After committing a mistake, the social planner will review actual changes in social
welfare and adjust the weight attached to all experts according to their previous pro-
jections. The weight attached to the expert providing incorrect projections will thus be
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deflated by β. The weight of the other expert, on the other hand, will remain unchanged,
as this expert will have correctly predicted a net welfare loss. As a result of this adap-
tation, the expert always giving correct advice will from there on always surpass the
critical threshold of α = 0.5, whereas the expert giving incorrect advice never will.
At this point, the economy will have effectively transitioned into Case 1 described
above where the social planner will never receive any false information that can affect the
actions. Welfare losses from policy-making mistakes are temporary and, as welfare losses
in any given period are assumed to be bounded, they are bounded over the duration of
the process of implementing growth diagnostics.
Case 3: prolonged possibility for mistakes
Last, we consider the case, where, starting from a given time period, both experts
may provide incorrect projections on the welfare losses associated with policy changes. In
particular, we now assume that both experts consistently predict no indirect interaction
effects on social welfare between the two policies of taxing gasoline and levying tolls on
public roads.
As in the previous case, due to the positive direct effects of the policy- package as
well as the critical support from experts, the social planner will implement the policy-
package and, thus, make a mistake. However, as now both experts incorrectly predicted
net welfare gains, the social planner will deflate both of their weights by β. As long
as the experts do not alter their prediction patterns, the economy may enter a loop of
revoking and implementing the policy-package in alternating periods. Even though the
overall weight on experts will keep declining, the detrimental policy- package will not
lose critical support. In this scenario, the social planner may therefore be prone to enter
a prolonged period of mistakes, leading to social welfare losses accumulating over time.
However, the almost surely finite mistakes property ensures that such losses may not
be continue indefinitely. By construction, one expert must begin solely providing correct
projections of welfare losses associated with policy changes after a finite amount of time.
This has two main effects. First, although mistakes may still be conducted initially,
experts providing support for them will lose critical support (in relative terms). Hence,
through the social planner adapting weights, the propensity for committing further mis-
takes will be curbed. Second, policy changes actually leading to net social welfare gains
are now ensured to be proposed. Again, the mechanism behind the weight adjustments
of experts will ultimately favour those policies.
Qualitatively, the economy will have transitioned into Case 2 described above. De-
spite the possibility for continuous mistakes compounding losses in terms of social wel-
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fare, these are bounded over the duration of the optimisation problem as by the almost
surely finite mistakes property one of the experts will start providing solely correct es-
timates after a finite amount of time and losses in any given period are assumed to be
bounded.
These simplistic examples illustrate that under a variety of key scenarios, implement-
ing growth diagnostics will lead to social welfare losses being bounded. These intuitions,
indeed, maintain in a general setting (see Appendix E for a proof).
Proposition 1: Consider the adaptive policy process described above. Then, losses
are almost surely bounded.
This insight proves crucial for determining the economy’s welfare. The next propo-
sition demonstrates that any process which satisfies the condition that losses are almost
surely bounded will converge to the socially optimal outcome (Proof in Appendix E):
Proposition 2: When losses are almost surely bounded, starting from a socially
suboptimal trajectory X, the adaptive forecasting and policy implementation process leads
to the socially optimal trajectory Y .
3.4 Discussion
The fundamental insight form the theoretical analysis is that an adaptive forecasting and
policy-making process where small adjustments are made in the direction of potential
welfare gains will over time converge to a socially optimal outcome even allowing for the
possibility of making mistakes. In this section, we illustrate how such a process could
play out in practice with reference to a number of actual historical examples.
The potential benefits of incremental, adaptive policy experimentation, as well as
the dangers of not doing so, are well exemplified by the economic history of China. In
1958, the communist government launched the Great Leap Forward movement. Its goal
was to boost the country’s industrial production. Ambitions for the project went as high
as surpassing the United Kingdom in terms of raw output within 15 years. In order to
achieve these dramatic results, resources, in the form of labour reallocation and increased
direct taxation, were diverted from the Chinese agriculture (among other sectors).
In the short-run, the reform successfully achieved some its intended direct effects by
raising the steel output from 5.35 million tons in 1957 to 18.66 million tons in 1960.
However, the estimated capabilities of the agricultural sector to cope with increased
quotas with fewer dedicated inputs turned out horrendously false.
The outcome was a disaster. (Li and Yang, 2005) provide a detailed analysis of
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the events. China’s food production collapsed, with grain output falling by about 15%
in each of the years 1959-1961. Even by the most conservative estimates, the resulting
famine claimed the highest number of lives in recorded world history. The country’s gross
domestic product stagnated in 1960 and then fell by 16% and 5.6% in 1961 and 1962,
respectively the two worst performances from 1952 until today (data from National
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017). Li and Yang (2005) show that the communist
party’s proclaimed explanation of bad weather as the main cause of the events accounts
for only 13% of food shortages. They found that over 60% of the decline in grain
production, and thus the ensuing humanitarian and economic crisis, was attributable to
errors in decision-making of the government.3
The development strategy of the economically highly successful post-Mao era con-
trasted starkly from its precursor. Deng Xiaoping famously coined the Chinese style
of policy-making of the time as ”crossing the river by feeling the stones”- a gradual,
adaptive and directed progression that preceded each step in reforming by careful test-
ing. This approach was in part necessitated by the lack of the ruling elite of an exact
and comprehensive blueprint for China’s future (Lin et al., 2003; Naughton, 2006). But
rather than forcing the intended changes through the political opposition, the adaptive
reform implementation took the existing uncertainties deliberately into account. In fact,
Heilmann (2008a,b) gives policy experimentation a front-row seat in China’s economic
miracle.
Many times over, momentous and potentially risky policy changes in China’s trans-
formation process were first tried out and studied on isolated parts of the economy before
they were scaled-up. Long before China joined the World Trade Organisation and com-
mitted to today’s level of openness to foreign enterprises, the government piloted special
economic zones: geographically clearly defined areas in which the effects of internation-
alisation on the local economies could be observed and evaluated. The transition from
a planning economy with centrally fixed prices to a market economy was mediated via
a dual-price system: quotas had to be delivered at plan-prices while any surplus could
be sold for private profits by the producers.
3Another example is the desiccation of the Aral Sea under the rule of the former Soviet Union. Starting
in the 1940s, the water inflows of the then fourth largest lake in the world were diverted for irrigation
in order to foster agricultural production in the surrounding desert environment. While the project
achieved the desired direct effects by temporarily making Uzbekistan the largest exporter of cotton in
1980 (National Cotton Council of America, 2017), the environmental and economic repercussions were
vastly underestimated. By 1988, the continued shrinking of the lake and its increasing salination already
caused losses of billions of rubles by entirely wiping out the area’s fishing industry, damaging other
branches and causing serious health problems in the population (Micklin, 1988). By 2007, the lake’s
surface area had shrunk to 10% of its original surface area with recent counter-measures only slowly
reversing the trend (Micklin and Aladin, 2008).
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More recently, China continues to pursue the internationalisation of its currency,
the Renminbi, in a similar fashion. In 2004, the government showed first signs of its
intentions by allowing Hong Kong based banks to open Renminbi accounts with lim-
ited conversion allowances. In 2009, the Renminbi was legitimised to settle trade with
ASEAN members as well as Macao and Hong Kong in five Chinese cities. Upon satisfac-
tory results, the scheme was first extended in mid-2010 so that firms in twenty provinces
could settle all trade in the local currency. Nowadays essentially all trade settlements
may be executed with it (Eichengreen and Kawai, 2015).
While the economic history of China tells a compelling story of the dangers of ”Big-
Bang reformism” and the potential benefits of deliberate experimentation, both instances
are by no means purely Chinese phenomena. Mukand and Rodrik (2005) note that while
most Latin American countries vigorously underwent structural reforms, the national
governments forced the commonly agreed best practices at the time upon the national
economies with little care given to local needs. As a result, nearly all those countries
achieved slower growth rates after the reforms than before.
A growing number of governments around the world reflect the lessons learned from
history by harnessing the power of adaptive, policy-experimentation. The United King-
dom is at the forefront of the movement. Jowell (2003) summarises the already extensive
role of pilot-studies in the UK’s policy-making in the early 2000s. The national trend
lately cumulated into the formation of the What Works Network with a total of nine in-
stitutions devoted to supplement political decision-makers with field evidence at crucial
stages of reform design.
Finally, List and Gneezy (2014) cite the example of the movie delivery platform
Netflix to argue for policy-experimentation not only on the side of national governments,
but also as the cutting-edge in business managements. In 2011, the management of the
then rising star in the market made a series of unfortunate decisions which resulted in
falling customer subscriptions and subsequently plummeting stocks that brought the firm
to the brink of bankruptcy. Today, literally every product change at the company is first
tried out on an isolated cell of the consumer base. As the reason for their strategy the
company state that such interventions are simply ”too risky to roll out without extensive
(...) testing.” (Techblog, 2017) While these trials, in contrast to the policy-changes
discussed in our main model, are carried out only on subsets of the relevant populations
and are thus comparatively sterile in character, they exemplify the importance of using
results of policy impact as feedback to guide reform priorities in the future.
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3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we view growth diagnostics as an iterative tool for identifying the priorities
of policy reform: at each point in time, reduce the section-best distortion or gap with
the greatest direct social impact. We show that such a process converges to the socially
optimal allocation even if the policy-maker incurs unintended social welfare losses.
The formal analysis reported here provides a set of convergence results that demon-
strate that growth diagnostics is a robust, flexible policy framework. However, in prac-
tice, policy reform is constrained by political interests. The results we obtain here
constitute a starting point for an analysis that take such political constraints explicitly
into account.
In future work, we plan to extend the analysis reported here to examine how special
interest groups can attempt to influence which second-best distortions are addressed and




E.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Starting from some trajectory X 6= Y , at each t ≥ 0, there are two possibilities: (1) the
total weight on signals predicting a net social welfare gain exceeds αFt, and (2) the total
weight on signals predicting a net social welfare gain is strictly less than αFt. At t, a
mistake is only possible if (1) prevails.
Let Fm denote the total weight on signals when the policy-maker makes the m-th
mistake. At the time period when the policy maker makes the m-th mistake, the overall
weight of the signals forecasting a net social welfare gain must be at least αFm; the weight
on the signals forecasting a net social welfare loss is unchanged at (1− α)βFm−1.
By computation it follows that
Fm ≤ (1− α)βFm−1 + αFm−1
= Fm−1 ((1− α)β + α) .
Moreover, Fm ≥ βm
∗
as the current weight on signal s∗, fs∗,t, must be such that
fs∗,t ≥ βm
∗
(given that 0 < β < 1) and Fm ≥ fs∗,t. Therefore, it must be the case that
βm
∗ ≤ Fm−1 ((1− α)β + α)
from which it follows that
βm
∗ ≤ F0 ((1− α)β + α)m
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which, by computation, is equivalent to
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which, by computation, is equivalent to











as (1− α)β + α < 1.
Therefore, along the sequence generated by the adaptive policy process, with prob-
ability one, there is at most a finite number of mistakes and the sum over gross realised
social welfare losses across all the time periods in which mistakes are made is bounded
above by mmaxL̃.
When a mistake does not occur at time t, we have that bt − lt ≥ 0. Now, along the
sequence generated by the adaptive forecasting and policy implementation process, it
must be the case that limt→∞∆ (X(t)) = 0 (as the total social welfare gains is bounded
which follows from the assumption that W is a continuous function over a compact set).
It follows that with probability one, limt→∞ lt = 0. Therefore,
∞∑
t=0
lt ≤ L̂, for some
finite L̂, with probability one, across all the time periods when no mistake occurs.
Set L = mmaxL̃+ L̂. Then, gross social welfare losses are almost surely bounded by
L.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let X(t) be the current trajectory picked by the iterated application of growth diagnos-
tics and let Wt be the associated level of social welfare. Let lt be the social welfare loss
incurred in period t, where if no social welfare loss occurs in period t then lt = 0).
By assumption the total social welfare loss is almost surely bounded. Let the sequence
Vt, indexed by t, be given by Vt = Wt +
t∑
k=0
lk. Then this new sequence Vt is increasing.
It is also bounded as it is the sum of two bounded sequences. Therefore it converges to
a limit, say V̂ . But this implies that Wt also converges to some limit Ŵ .
Let the associated sequence of trajectories be labelled as
(




denote any limit point of the sequence with W (Ŷ ) = Ŵ .
Under the assumption of almost surely bounded losses, there is a subsequence (with a
slight abuse of notation, denoted in the same way as the original sequence)
(
X̂(t) : t ≥ 0
)










> 0 at each t ∈ T . By continuity of W , there exists a T ′ such that for all





As losses are almost surely bounded, it follows that there exists T ′′ such that for all




> 0. But, then, Ŷ cannot be a limit point, a contradiction.
Therefore, W (Ŷ ) = W (Y ) and by continuity of W (.) over X, W (Ŷ ) = W and by




This thesis describes how smart information management can be utilised to improve
outcomes for economic agents. Various mechanisms in diverse contexts are discussed to
explore the potential to do so.
Chapter 1 studies a firm in which a manager may make systematic mistakes when
prioritising adjustments to changing circumstances across different departments. I show
theoretically that in this scenario the owner may improve profits by implementing the
management technique ’management-by-exception’, resulting in a restricted access to
information for the manager. It should be noted that these results obtain without any
inherent conflict of interests in the firm, but instead are mainly driven by psychological
tendencies causing the manager to incorrectly evaluate information.
In Chapter 2, I discuss evidence from a computer laboratory experiment in the realm
of household finance. In the real-world, private households tend to decrease their net
profits from participating on the stock market by trading too much and, thus, incurring
costs via commission fees, increased taxes and other positions. Participants in the exper-
iment qualitatively emulate this behaviour in the laboratory despite being incentivised to
maximise their gains from trading. I consider two information interventions to increase
trading profits. First, I provide feedback, allowing subjects to more easily discover their
own inability to increase profits from trading actively. Second, I reduce access to historic
portfolio performance in order to curb overreactions to recent movements in stock value.
Both interventions lead to significant changes in behaviour and increase net profits for
participants.
Chapter 3 theoretically deals with a government trying to prioritise reforms. Despite
being well-informed on any direct effects that a given policy-package may trigger, the
government faces uncertainties on effects that may arise when changes in different realms
of the economy interact. Hence, the government may actually make mistakes when
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implementing policies, causing overall social welfare to decrease with any given action.
Even allowing for such mistakes, the chapter outlines conditions under which the policy-
makers will still cause the economy to converge towards the social optimum. A key
role in this process falls on the ability of policy-makers to use performance feedback on
their policies in order to adjust the credibility of experts providing projections for future
policy projects.
A large literature studies the propensity of controlling an agent’s information chan-
nels towards guiding the agent’s behaviour. Predominantly, these setups feature an
inherent conflict of interests between the information designer and the receiver of the
information. As a consequence, the information designer uses the control over the infor-
mation channels to the detriment of the receiver. With this thesis, I hope to extend the
scope of this method of persuasion. I show that purposefully manipulating an individ-
ual’s inflow of information may mitigate negative consequences arising from systematic
mistakes in the decision-making. It may thus help individuals making the correct choices
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mental Overconfidence, Self-Monitoring, and Trading Performance in an Experimental
Financial Market,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72 (2), 287–312.
Blackwell, David, “Comparison of Experiments,” in “Proceedings of the Second Berke-
ley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability” University of California
Press Berkeley, Calif. 1951, pp. 93–102.
, “An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs,” Pacific Journal of Mathe-
matics, 1956, 6 (1), 1–8.
Blanco, Mariana, Patricio S. Dalton, and Juan F. Vargas, “Does the Unem-
ployment Benefit Institution Affect the Productivity of Workers? Evidence from the
Field,” Management Science, 2017, 63 (11), 3691–3707.
Bloom, Nicholas and John Van Reenen, “Measuring and Explaining Management
Practices across Firms and Countries,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007,
122 (4), 1351–1408.
, Erik Brynjolfsson, Lucia Foster, Ron Jarmin, Megha Patnaik, Itay
Saporta-Eksten, and John Van Reenen, “What Drives Differences in Manage-
ment?,” mimeo, 2017.
Bondt, Werner F. M. De and Richard Thaler, “Does the Stock Market Overre-
act?,” The Journal of Finance, 1985, 40 (3), 793–805.
Bono, Joyce E. and Timothy A. Judge, “Personality and Transformational and
Transactional Leadership: A Meta-Analysis,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 2004, 89
(5), 901–910.
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer, “Salience Theory of
Choice Under Risk,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 127 (3), 1243.
, , and , “Salience and Consumer Choice,” Journal of Political Economy, 2013,
121 (5), 803–843.
Brocas, Isabelle and Juan D. Carrillo, “Influence through ignorance,” The RAND
Journal of Economics, 2007, 38 (4), 931–947.
136
Burns, James MacGregor, Leadership, New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
Business Dictionary, “management by exception (MBE),” http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/management-by-exception-MBE.html
2018. Accessed: 2018-07-19.
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni, Joan de Mart́ı, and Andrea Prat, “Communication
and influence,” Theoretical Economics, 2015, 10 (2), 649–690.
Campos, Nauro F. and Abrizio Coricelli, “Growth in Transition: What We Know,
What We Don’t, and What We Should,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2002, 40
(3), 793–836.
Cesa-Bianchi, N. and G. Lugosi, Prediction, Learning, and Games, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Chen, An-Sing and Teng Yuan Cheng, “Are men more overconfident than women?
Evidence from the Taiwan futures market,” mimeo, 2018.
Cho, Seo-Young, “Explaining Gender Differences in Confidence and Overconfidence
in Math,” mimeo, 2017.
Copeland, Thomas E. and Daniel Friedman, “The Market Value of Information:
Some Experimental Results,” The Journal of Business, 1992, 65 (2), 241–266.
Cronqvist, Henrik and Stephan Siegel, “The genetics of investment biases,” Journal
of Financial Economics, 2014, 113 (2), 215 – 234.
Croson, Rachel and Uri Gneezy, “Gender Differences in Preferences,” Journal of
Economic Literature, June 2009, 47 (2), 448–74.
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